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INTRODUCTION

At least since the Supreme Court's 1976 landmark campaign finance
decision in Buckley v. Valeo,l the link between money and speech has
been one of the battleground issues in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Buckley's early critics honed in on this question,2 and it continues to
3
provoke debate between justices. But as the campaign finance cases
have progressed, and especially with the Court's recent decision in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,4 which upheld almost all of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, another equally fundamental
issue has emerged: Is it permissible to restrict campaign contributions or
independent advocacy not only to prevent corruption, but also, in the
words of Justice Breyer, lito democratize the influence that money can
bring to bear upon the electoral process,,?5 While the Buckley Court
confidently declared that "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,,,6 more recent
decisions, including McConnell, have steadily chipped away at that
7
categorical clairn. And though a majority of the Court has yet to
recognize a First Amendment interest in promoting equality of influence
on or participation in electoral politics, there is a strong argument that
the outcome of McConnell can be explained only by reference to such a
s
principle.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.s. 1 (1976).
See J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. 1. REV. 609, 631-32 (1982); J. Skelly Wright, Politics
and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE 1.J. 1001, 1005 (1976); see also Burt Neubome,
Buckley's Analytical Flaws, 6 J.1. & POL'Y 111, 115 (1997).
3
See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 378 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("Money is property; it is not speech"); id. at 413-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that result of contribution limits "is simply the suppression of political speech");
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,649 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Mloney is not always equivalent to or used for speech, even in
the context of political campaigns." (quoting Buckley, 424 U.s. at 263 (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part))); id. at 635-40 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that "contribution limits infringe as directly and as seriously upon
freedom of political expression and association as do expenditure limits").
4 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.s. 93 (2003).
5 Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. 1. REV. 245,
252 (2002).
6
Buckley, 424 U.s. at 48-49.
7
See Richard 1. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. 1. REV. 31, 57-58
(2004).
8 Id. at 58-59.
There is also a good argument that Buckley's own anticorruption
1

2
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These are familiar observations in discussions of campaign finance
regulation. What is less often noticed is that the same issues - the
connection between money and speech and the extent to which there is a
First Amendment interest in the proper functioning of political forums
- are central to another, less prominent line of Supreme Court cases.
These are the cases that establish a First Amendment right against
9
compelled subsidization.
The basic idea of the compelled subsidization doctrine is that the First
Amendment prohibits the government from requiring some individuals
to subsidize the First Amendment activities of others. To oversimplify:
you cannot be forced to pay for someone else's speech. Those who argue
for such a First Amendment right often quote Thomas Jefferson's
pronouncement that lito compel a man to furnish contributions of money
for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and
tyrannical."!
To date, the Supreme Court has considered the
constitutionality of compelled subsidization in four contexts: statutorily
enabled agency shops (where employees are required to subsidize union
political activities), integrated bars (where attorneys are required to pay
for the legislative activities of a state bar association), industry trade
associations (where industry members are required to help fund generic
advertising campaigns), and state university student activity fees (where
students are required to subsidize the political and ideological activities
of student organizations). It has also been argued that the compelled
subsidization doctrine should limit the use of Interest on Lawyer Trust
Account ("IOLTA") funds,l1 mandatory pro bono requirements}2

rationale tacitly relies on a political equality principle. See David A. Strauss, Corruption,
Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1369-70 (1994); David A.
Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 143 (1995).
9
Leslie Gielow Jacobs also explored the possible connection between the First
Amendment's approaches to campaign finance regulation and to compelled subsidization.
Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Link Between Student Activity Fees and Campaign Finance
Regulations, 33lNo. L. REV. 435 (2000). While the argument irJ this Article is consonant with
Jacobs's emphasis on the First Amendment's protections agairJst "governmental favoritism
of certairJ viewpoirJts in the marketplace of ideas," it departs from Jacobs on a number of
particulars, not the least beirJg whether such favoritism is "[tJhe primary danger against
which the free speech clause protects." ld.
10 Thomas Jefferson, The Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, in THE VIRGINIA
STATUTE FOR REUGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY, at xvii (Merrill Peterson & Robert Vaughan eds., 1988); see infra notes 99,114.
11 See Terence E. Doherty, The Constitutionality of IOLTA Accounts, 19 WHITITER L. REV.
487 (1998); David J. HrirJa, Comment, The Future ofIOLTA: Has the Death Knell Been Sounded
for Mandatory IOLTA Programs?, 32 AKRON L. REV. 301 (1999); Risa I. Sackmary, Note,
IOLTA'S Last Obstacle: WashirIgton Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found.'s Faulty
Analysis of Attorneys' First Amendment Rights, 2 J.L. & POL'y 187 (1994).
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continuing legal education requirements,!3 the charitable donations of
utility companies,14 cigarette surtaxes used to fund anti-smoking
16
campaigns/5 and some forms of public campaign financing.
7
Since announcing the right against compelled subsidization in 1977/ a
majority of the Supreme Court has remained willing to affirm it. Over
the years, however, the Court has employed different standards to
decide compelled subsidization cases. And it has never settled on a
single account of the doctrine's theoretical underpinnings - just what
First Amendment interest is threatened by compelled subsidization. In
recent years, tensions have come to a head. In three separate decisions,
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot (1997)/8 Board of Regents v. Southworth
(2000)/9 and United States v. United Foods (2001),20 the Supreme Court has
made significant and, at times, inconsistent amendments to the doctrine,
without indicating how the new standards are to be reconciled with the
old or applied to novel cases. At present, it is difficult to discern what
rules govern compelled subsidization and where the constitutional limits
lie.
The root cause of the current confusion is the Supreme Court's failure
to provide a coherent account of the First Amendment harm of
compelled subsidization. Part I of this Article describes the present state
of the doctrine. It identifies a number of practical problems, especially
the imprecisions in and conflicts between the Court's holdings that leave
it unclear how lower courts should decide novel cases. Part II is a critical
discussion of the two most common arguments for a First Amendment
right against compelled subsidization: that compelled subsidization
infringes on dissenters' freedom of belief and that it restricts their
freedom of expression. A comparison of compelled subsidization with
the First Amendment interests at stake in compelled speech shows that
neither argument withstands scrutiny and that this deficiency in theory

" See John C. Scully,. Mandatory Pro Bono: An Attack on the Constitution, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1229 (1991).
13
See Kari M. Dahlin, Note, Actions Speak Louder than Thoughts: The Constitutionally
Questionable Reach of the Minnesota CLE Elimination of Bias Requirement, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1725 (2000).
14
See R. Paul Gee, Note, Who Pays for Charitable Contributions Made by Utility
Companies?, 12 ENERGY L.J. 363 (1991).
15
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 384 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2004).
16
See May v. McNally, 55 P.3d 768 (Ariz. 2002).
17
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
18 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
19
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.s. 217 (2000).
20
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
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is the cause of much of the confusion in practice. Part III argues that if
there is a First Amendment right against compelled subsidization, it is
grounded not in the liberty interests of dissenting individuals, but in
compelled subsidization's potential harm to public political discourse.
This brings a fresh perspective on the idea that there is a First
Amendment interest in "democratizing the influence of money on the
electoral process," and suggests a new, more general test for compelled
subsidization cases. Part IV briefly discusses what it would take to
transpose the results from a reformed compelled subsidization doctrine
into the register of campaign finance regulation.
A decision like McConnell comes along once in a generation. At least
for the next few years, lower courts probably will be left to their own
devices in grappling with its implications for campaign finance
regulation, including the extent to which there is a First Amendment
interest in regulating equality of influence or participation in the
electoral sphere. The compelled subsidization doctrine provides an
opportunity to address these issues without losing oneself in the
doctrinal and political complexities of campaign finance. The Supreme
Court will revisit the doctrine this Term in Veneman v. Livestock Marketing
Ass'ns, a case involving the requirement that beef producers pay for
21
generic beef advertising. One can only hope that the Court granted
certiorari in Veneman to deal at least with the confusion in the industryassociation advertising cases. With luck, it will also take the opportunity
22
to clarify the doctrine as a whole. By clearing away the underbrush
surrounding compelled subsidization, it may be possible to develop
tools to attack the jungle of campaign finance.
I.

PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE: DIFFICULTIES WITH THE DOCTRINE AS IT Now

STANDS

The compelled subsidization doctrine is situated at the periphery of
First Amendment jurisprudence and has received little sustained

21 Veneman v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 2389 (U.s. May 24,2004) (No. 03-1164).
22
The Solicitor General's petition for certiorari in the case focuses on another question,
left undecided in United Foods: whether such industry advertising programs are
government speech. Pet. for Cert. at 12-24, Veneman v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d 711
(8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2389 (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No. 03-1164). If the Court
were to decide the case on this issue, finding that the program at issue is government
speech, it would not have to address the compelled subsidization question. This Article
argues below, however, that basically the same test should apply under either
characterization.
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attention, either from courts or from commentators. 23 As a result, its
branches have spread faster than its roots. This part describes the tree
from the trunk up - the contexts in which the Supreme Court has
applied the compelled subsidization doctrine and the tests it has
developed to decide cases. It turns out that the motley collection of
Supreme Court holdings makes it all but impossible to say how courts
should decide novel cases. Parts II and III then turn to the roots. Part II
examines the principal arguments the Court and individual justices have
used to justify the doctrine. Part III proposes an alternative account of its
fundament and recommends pruning a few branches.
The Supreme Court first considered the idea of a First Amendment
right against compelled subsidization in Railway Employee's Department v.
Hanson, a 1956 case involving dissenting railway employees' objections
to mandatory union dues under a federally enabled union sho~
24
agreement.
The Court avoided the constitutional issue in Hanson.
And it avoided the issue again in two 1961 decisions, International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street,26 which also concerned union shop agreements,
and Lathrop v. Donahue,27 which dealt with integrated state bars.
It was not until 1977, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, that a
majority of the Court was willing to affirm a First Amendment right
23 The first law review article devoted to the general grounds of the compelled
subsidization doctrine was Norman L. Cantor's Forced Payments to Seroice Institutions and
Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-association, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 3 (1983). The
doctrine has since been given sustained attention by Leslie Gielow Jacobs in Pledges,
Parades, and Mandatory Payments, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 123 (1999) and Jacobs, supra note 9,
and by Howard Wasserman in Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 TuL. L.
REV. 163 (2002). Other commentators simply treat the compelled subsidization cases as a
species of compelled speech cases. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance
Problem,64 FORDHAM L. REv. 451, 467 (1995); Robert D. Kamenshine, Reflections on Coerced
Expression, 34 LAND & WATER L. Rw. 101, 108-10 (1999). One of the conclusions of this
Article is that if the compelled subsidization doctrine has a secure foundation, it is different
from that of the compelled speech doctrine.
24
Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.s. 225 (1956).
2S

See id.

" Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740 (1961).
27
Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 u.s. 820 (1961). While these cases avoided deciding the
constitutional issue, their statutory construction and strong dissenting and concurring
opinions from Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Harlan laid the groundwork for the
constitutional decisions that followed. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 516
(1991) ("Although [it is a case] of statutory construction, Street [is] instructive in delineating
the bounds of the First Amendment in this area as well."); id. at 555 (Scalia, J., concurring
with judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Street [was a statutory case], but there is
good reason to treat [it] as merely reflecting the constitutional rule suggested in Hanson and
later confirmed in Abood. Street adopted a construction of the [Railway Labor Act] nowhere
suggested in its language, to avoid 'serious doubt of [its] constitutionality.'" (quoting

Street».
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28
against compelled subsidization. In a series of decisions between 1977
and 1991, the Court developed the doctrine with respect to two types of
cases. The first group of cases involved government-enabled union shop
agreements, in which dissenting employees objected to requirements
that they help pay for union speech with which they disagreed. 29 The
second dealt with integrated bars, in which attorneys complained of
being required to pay dues that supported the state bar association's
expressive activities.3D During this period, the Court's opinions focused
on the uses to which challenged payments were put. Abood, the case that
established a First Amendment right against compelled subsidization,
identified the following salient factors:
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for
the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or
toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to
its duties as collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the
constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed from
charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not Object
to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing SO.3
This statement emphasizes two questions: Are expenditures germane to
the activity for which payments are compelled? And, are they political
or ideological in nature? Abood held that if an expenditure is both
nongermane and funds political or ideological activities, then it violates
32
As the cases progressed, this
dissenters' First Amendment rights.
approach was refined and generalized until in 1991, in Lehnert v. Ferris

28
29

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.s. 209,235-36 (1977).
Lehnert, 500 U.s. 507; Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood, 431 U.s.

209.
30 Kelier v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
In addition to these cases and'
subsequent cases discussed below, the Supreme Court has ruled on the procedural
safeguards necessary to protect the rights of dissenting union members and provided
statutory interpretations that paraliel the First Amendment compelled subsidization
doctrine. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.s. 866 (1998); Communication Workers of
Am. v. Beck, 487 U.s. 735 (1988); Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.s. 292 (1986); Minn.
State Bd. of Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.s. 271 (1984); Bhd. of Ry. & 5.5. Clerks v. Allen, 373
U.s. 113 (1963); Street, 367 U.s. 740; Hanson, 351 U.S. 225.
31
Abood, 431 U.s. at 235-36 (italics added); see also id. at 236 (finding relevant
distinction to be that "between collective-bargaining activities, for which contributions may
be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining, for which such
compulsion is prohibited."). Keller employed an identical test. Keller, 496 U.s. at 14 ("The
State Bar may . . . constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals out of the
mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner fund activities of an
ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity.").
32 Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
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Faculty Ass'n, a majority of the Court agreed with the following
formulation:
chargeable activities must (1) be "germane" to collective-bargaining
activity; (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in
labor peace and avoiding "free riders"; and (3) not significantly add
to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of
. sop.
h 31
an agency or uruon
To further generalize:
challenged expenditures violate the First
Amendment rights of dissenters unless they are (1) germane to (2) a vital
governmental interest and (3) do not Significantly add to the burden on
dissenters' free speech interests inherent in the furtherance of that
34
interest.
In recent years, the Court has moved on to other types of compelled
subsidization - mandatory assessments for generiC industry advertising
and state university student-activity fees. In doing so, the Court has
departed from the Abood-Lehnert approach, as discussed below.
Nonetheless, Lehnert represents a sort of high-water mark in the
development of the compelled subsidization doctrine, for it provides the
most generic statement of when compelled subsidization violates the
First Amendment, a test that seemingly still applies in the union and
35
state bar cases. But there are two significant problems with the Lehnert
test.
The first is that germaneness is a particularly vague standard. Lehnert
does not specify how germane an expenditure must be - how closely it
must relate to the government's legitimate purpose - to survive
constitutional scrutiny. As the Court has since noted, this problem was

Lehnert, 500 U.s. at 519.
On the way to Lehnert, the Court formulated a somewhat more permissive test. Ellis
v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks held that the first question to ask is whether the expenditure
is germane to the union's collective bargaining activities (Le., to the legitimate government
interest in compelling dissenters to pay). Ellis, 466 U.S. at 456. If expenditures are not
germane, then they are not allowed. If germane, a court must then ask "whether these
expenses involve additional interference with the First Amendment interests of objecting
employees, and, if so, whether they are nonetheless adequately supported by a
governmental interest." ld. at 456. That is, germane expenditures are constitutional only if
the governmental interest in compelling payments outweighs the harm to dissenters' First
Amendment rights. Lehnert replaced this balancing of the government's interest against the
First Amendment harm with two separate requirements: a vital governmental interest and
no significant addition to the burden on dissenters' free speech.
35 See, e.g., Otto v. Penn. State Educ. Ass'n-NEA, 330 F.3d 125, 135-40 (3d Cir. 2003)
(union dues); Romero v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico, 204 F.3d 291, 296-303 (1st
Cir. 2000) (state bar).
3J

34
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manifest in the conflicting opinions in Lehnert itself.36 Justice Marshall, in
a partial dissent, argued that any expenditure "reasonably designed to
influence the public employer's position at the bargaining table" was
37
germane to a teachers' union's collective bargaining activities.
He
concluded that lobbying, public relations campaigns in support of the
teaching profession in general, and litigation outside of the collective
bargaining group were all germane to the state's legitimate purpose in
38
promoting the agency-shop agreements. Justice Scalia, also dissenting
in part, considered a union expenditure germane only if "incurred for
the conduct of activities in which the union owes a duty of fair
representation to nonmembers being charged.,,39 He therefore found
almost all of the challenged union expenditures - including nonpolitical
union publications, union conventions, national collective bargaining
expenses and the costs of preparing for a strike - nongermane and
40
nonfundable by the contributions of dissenting employees. The Lehnert
majority wanted a concept of germaneness lying somewhere between
these extremes, for it disallowed expenditures that Marshall would have
41
permitted and allowed expenditures Scalia considered unconstitutiona1.
But it failed to specify just where on the spectrum between Marshall and
Scalia its concept of germaneness lay and thus provided little guidance
as to how the criterion should be applied.
A second difficulty comes with the third step of the Lehnert test, which
requires that expenditures "not significantly add to the burdening of free
speech that is inherent in the allowance" of the compelled payments.42 In
order to determine whether a given government action burdens First
36
Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.s. 217, 231-32 (2000) ("Even in the context of a
labor union, whose functions are, or so we might have thought, well known and
understood by the law and the courts after a long history of government regulation and
judicial involvement, we have encountered difficulties in deciding what is germane and
what is not. The difficulty manifested itself in our decision in Lehnert . .. where different
members of the Court reached varying conclusions regarding what expressive activity was
or was not germane to the mission of the association.").
The various opinions in Lehnert were foreshadowed in the different understandings
of germaneness in Street. Where the plurality found that political activities were not
germane to the union's collective bargaining activities, Frankfurter emphasized "the
practical necessity for unions to participate in . . . political activities." Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740, 768, 811 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
37
Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 533 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38 Id. at 535-37.
39 [d. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40 [d. at 550-58.
41
See id. at 524-27 (criticizing Scalia's proposed germaneness test).
42 [d. at 519.
This third prong presumably explains why Abood emphasized the
political or ideological nature of certain expenditures. [d.
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Amendment interests, we must know what the relevant interests are.
The problem, which Part II explores at length, is that the Court has never
settled on a good account of just how compelled subsidization threatens
the First Amendment rights of dissenting payers. Instead, it has
vacillated between two approaches. The first holds that compelled
subsidization infringes on dissenters' freedom of belief by requiring
them to act contrary to their conscience. The second maintains that
compelled subsidization is simply another form of compelled speech,
and therefore violates dissenters' First Amendment right to remain
silent.
That these different accounts of the relevant First Amendment interest
can produce conflicting results as to how much payments "add to the
burdening of free speech" was vividly demonstrated by the first postLehnert decision, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc. 43 Though
Wileman did not apply the Lehnert standard in any straightforward way,
its outcome turned on the question of whether there was a burdening of
First Amendment interests. The case concerned federally mandated
assessments on fruit growers that went toward funding generic fruit
advertising. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, reasoned that
compelled subsidization implicates the First Amendment only to the
extent that it interferes with dissenters' freedom of belief.

Abood, and the cases that follow it, did not announce a broad First
Amendment right not to be compelled to provide financial support
for any organization that conducts expressive activities. Rather,
Abood merely recognized a First Amendment interest in not being
compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive
activities conflict with one's "freedom of belief.,,44
The majority concluded that the First Amendment right against
compelled subsidization extends only to cases in which the subsidized
message creates for the dissenting payer a "crisis of conscience.,,45 While
"political or ideological disagreement with the content of the message"
can produce such a crisis, the dissenting fruit growers' objections to the
advertisements they were required to help fund did not rise to that level
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.s. 457 (1997).
[d. at 471 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 235); see also id. at 472 ("[C]ompelled
contributions for political purposes unrelated to collective bargaining implicated First
Amendment interests because they interfere with the values lying at the 'heart of the First
Amendment ... the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that
in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than
coerced by the State.'" (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35».
" [d. at 472.
43

«
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46

and thus did not implicate the First Amendment.
Justice Souter's dissent, on the other hand, viewed compelled
subsidization as a species of compelled speech, which gave rise to the
following three-step argument. First, commercial speech is due some
47
degree of First Amendment protection. Second, the Court's compelledspeech cases have established that "compelling cognizable speech
officially is just as suspect as suppressing it, and is typically subject to
the same level of scrutiny.,,48 Thus compelled commercial speech is
subject to the same level of scrutiny as restricted commercial speech.
4
Third, compelled subsidization is a species of compelled speech. It is
then a short step to the conclusion that "[s]ince a commercial speaker
(who does not mislead) may generally promote commerce as he sees fit,
the government requires some justification ... before it may force him to
subsidize commercial speech to which he objects."so
The different accounts of the First Amendment interests at stake in
Wileman lead the majority and dissent to radically different conclusions
as to how the case should have come out. The problem is that we have
not been told just what First Amendment interests the right against
compelled subsidization is meant to protect. And, without knowing
that, it is impossible to say when compelled subsidization "significantly
add[s] to the burdening of free speech that is inherent" in the legitimate
•
51
program at Issue.
In recent years, dissatisfaction with the germaneness standard, along
with the Court's inability to settle on a single account of the relevant First
Amendment interest, has led to a breakdown of the three-part Lehnert
test. A third significant problem with the current state of the doctrine is
that the cases decided since Lehnert have left uncertain what test courts
should apply to novel cases.
46
Id. For support of the proposition that the right not to subsidize extends only to
political or ideological speech, the majority appealed to Lehnert's finding that union
expenditures for nonpolitical publications do not violate the First Amendment rights of
dissenting members. Id. at 473 (citing Lehnert, 500 U.s. at 529).
47
Id. at 478-80 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing inter alia Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.s. 748 (1976)).
48
Id. at 481.
49
Id. at 481-82 ("As a familiar corollary to the principle that what may not be
suppressed may not be coerced, we have recognized ... that individuals have a First
Amendment interest in freedom from compulsion to subsidize speech and other expressive
activities undertaken by private and quasi-private organizations."), id. at 487 ("[S]peech
significant enough to be protected at some level is outside the government's power to
coerce or to support by mandatory subsidy without further justification.").
50 [d. at 487.
51 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.s. 507, 519 (1991).
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This is most apparent in the competing logics of the two post-Lehnert
decisions on the compelled subsidization of commercial speech, Wileman
52
and United States v. United Foods. As already noted, Wileman held in
1997 that federally mandated assessments to fund fruit advertising did
not infringe on the First Amendment rights of dissenting fruit growers. 53
Four years later, however, United Foods concluded that federally
mandated assessments to fund mushroom advertising violated the First
Amendment rights of dissenting mushroom producers. 54
Justice
Kennedy's United Foods· opinion attempts to explain the different
outcomes by emphasizing the fact that the advertising at issue in
Wileman was part of a broader program of industry regulation, whereas
the United Foods assessments on mushroom growers were used almost
55
solely to fund advertising. But a cursory reading of the opinions in
these cases reveals deeply conflicting logicS, suggesting that this
56
distinction did not make the difference in their outcomes.
The different holdings are better explained by the fact that United
Foods jettisoned Wileman's crisis-of-conscience test. As noted above, the
Wileman majority categorically rejected the argument that compelled
subsidization is a form of compelled speech.57 It reasoned instead that
compelled subsidization implicates the First Amendment only to the
extent that it interferes with dissenters' freedom of belief, which is to say,
only when it creates for the dissenting payer a "crisis of conscience."s8
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
53
Wileman, 521 U.S. at 472.
54
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 415-16.
55 Id. at 411-12.
56 See id. at 419-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting); infra p. 1091.
The causal-historical
explanation of the divergent outcomes lies in the decisions of Kennedy and Stevens to
switch sides on the issue. Both found the Wileman advertising programs constitutional
(Stevens writing majority opinion, which Kennedy jOined) and the United Foods advertising
programs unconstitutional (Kennedy writing majority opinion, which Stevens joined).
57 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469 (1997) ("[T]he marketing
orders ... do not compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech"); id. at
470-71 ("The use of assessments to pay for advertising does not require respondents to
repeat an objectionable message out of their own mouths ... require them to use their own
property to convey an antagonistic ideological message . . . force them to respond to a
hostile message when they 'would prefer to remain silent,' . . . or require them to be
publicly identified or associated with another's message .... Respondents are not required
themselves to speak, but are merely required to make contributions for advertising." (citing
Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 475 US. 1, 18 (1986), PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980), and W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ.v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632
(1943))).
58
Id. at 472. Wasserman suggests that the ratio decidendi of Wileman was that the
Court's "assum[ption] that the complaining producers would agree with [the] general
idea" of the challenged advertising, which simply encouraged consumers to buy California
52
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United Foods did away with Wileman's crisis-of-conscience approach,
reasoning that "there is no apparent principle which distinguishes out of
hand minor debates about whether a branded mushroom is better than
59
any mushroom" from supposedly more significant disagreements. This
suggests that the Court no longer adheres to the freedom-of-belief
account of the right not to subsidize.
United Foods did not, however, return to the freedom-of-speech
6o
account of Souter's Wileman dissent. Without further discussing the
grounds of the compelled subsidization doctrine, Kennedy's opinion
instead introduces a new germaneness test: an expenditure must not
only be germane to a legitimate purpose (the standard used by earlier
61
courts ), but it must be germane to a non-expressive program. The
expenditures at issue in United Foods fail this test because "the expression
respondent is required to support is not germane to a purpose related to
an association independent from the speech itself.,,62 The majority
tree fruit. Wasserman, supra note 23, at 180. I would argue that Wasserman here neglects
Wileman's focus on the potential for a "crisis of conscience."
" United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 411; see also id. at 410 ("The subject matter of the speech
may be of interest to but a small segment of the population; yet those whose business and
livelihood depend in some way upon the product involved no doubt deem First
Amendment protection to be just as important for them as it is for other discrete, little
noticed groups in a society which values the freedom resulting from speech in all its
diverse parts.").
United Foods later cites Abood for the proposition that "speech need not be
characterized as political before it receives First Amendment protection." Id. at 413 (citing
Abood, 431 U.S. at 232). The opinion refers here to a section of the Abood opinion that
concerned the plaintiffs' argument that because they were public employees and because
bargaining in the public sector is inherently political, they suffered a more significant First
Amendment harm than the plaintiffs in either Hanson or Street. Abood, 431 U.s. at 229-32.
The Abood Court rejected this argument with the remark that "[n]othing in the First
Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes the question whether the adjective
'political' can properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional inquiry." Id. at
232. But the Abood Court's response to this preliminary side issue should not be allowed to
obscure its emphasis in the main part of the opinion on the political and ideological nature
of the union's speech. Id. at 234-36.
60
Stevens, concurring, argued that compelled subsidization should not be considered a
form of compelled speech, but did not identify his preferred theory of the doctrine or say
whether he still held onto his Wileman opinion. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 417 (Stevens,
J., concurring). Thomas, concurring, argued that compelled subsidization is a form of
compelled speech. Id. at 418-19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
61
See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.s. at 217-22 (discussing government's interest in promoting
agency shops, as established by Hanson and Street); id. at 224-25 (relating those interests to
union's collective-bargaining activities); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (finding
that expenditures must serve legitimate purpose of integrated bar, which is to improve
quality of legal profession).
62
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 415. Stevens states a similar rule in his concurrence: "a
compelled subsidy is permissible when it is ancillary, or 'germane,' to a valid cooperative
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OpInIOn does not provide an argument for this new constitutional
criterion, but Stevens suggests one in his concurrence:
The incremental impact on the liberty of a person who has already
surrendered far greater liberty to the collective entity (either
voluntarily or as a result of permissible compulsion) does not, in my
judgment, raise a significant constitutional issue if it is ancillary to
the main purpose of the collective program. . .. The naked
imposition of such compulsion, like naked restraint on speech itself,
63
seems quite different to me.
The apparent idea behind Stevens's argument was succinctly captured
by Karl Llewellyn: "An institution we could not honor naked, we should
not dare to strip.,,64
The tension between the Court's industry advertising cases can be
summarized as follows. While United Foods did not overrule Wileman, it
explicitly rejected the logic on which the earlier case had been decided.
But if we no longer have the crisis-of-conscience test, it is difficult to see
how the outcome in Wileman can stand. Moreover, instead of providing
an alternative to Wileman's general crisis-of-conscience test, United Foods
introduces a new test that applies only in very specific circumstances,
namely, where compelled payments fund exclusively expressive
activities, as opposed to a broader regulatory program of which
expressive activities are merely a part. Finally, United Foods leaves it
unclear just why the First Amendment includes a right against
compelled subsidization. While implicitly rejecting Wileman's emphasis
on freedom of belief, it does not suggest an alternative account of the
right. Justices Stevens and Thomas su~gest sharply different answers to
that question in separate concurrences. This is evidence that there is no
endeavor." Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring).
63 Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring).
In a footnote to the above, Stevens makes the
striking statement that not only is compulsion as bad as restriction, but "government
compulsion to finance objectionable speech imposes a greater restraint on liberty than
government regulation of money used to subsidize the speech of others." Id. at 418 n.··.
Stevens provides no argument for this proposition, but perhaps felt it necessary to justify
his apparently contrary opinions about restrictions on campaign contributions. See Nixon
v. Shrink, 528 U.s. 377, 398-99 (Stevens, J., concurring) (doubting whether campaign
contributions deserve same level of protection against restriction as speech they help fund).
'" KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 125 (2DED.1951).
65
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing with Breyer, in
dissent, that "the program at issue in this case ... 'does not compel speech itself; it compels
the payment of money'''); id. at 418-19 (Thomas, J., concurring) (affirming his view "that
paying money for the purpose of advertising involves speech, and ... compelling speech
raises a First Amendment issue just as much as restricting speech." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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longer a majority opinion among the Court as to why there is a First
Amendment right not to subsidize.
These unresolved inconsistencies have left lower courts without any
clear guidance on how to decide industry-association advertising cases.
The confusion is exemplified by the Eighth Circuit's decision in Livestock
66
After explaining that it
Marketing Ass'n v. Department of Agriculture.
was "duty-bound to reconcile and apply the precedents of the Supreme
Court to the best of [its] ability,,,67 the panel guessed that if given the
chance, the United Foods majority would have applied the Central Hudson
test for commercial speech.68 It then read both the germaneness standard
from the Court's early compelled subsidization cases and Southworth's
viewpoint-neutrality test (see below) as methods for determining
"whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve
that interest.,,69 But then, rather than applying these rules, the Eighth
Circuit declined to "engage in such a line-drawing exercise,,,70 and
simply found that the challenged beef marketing program was identical
in all material respects to the mushroom checkoff program in United
71
Foods, and therefore violated the First Amendment. As noted above,
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case.
For the most part, both Wileman and United Foods ignore the three-part
Lehnert test. One can read each case, however, as attempting in its own
72
way to modify that standard.
The Court's third recent compelled
.. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n. v. United States Oep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2004).
67 ld. at 725.
68
ld. at 722; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). In considering the possible applicability of the Central Hudson test, the United Foods
Court did note that the government had not raised that argument as a reason not to apply
it in that case, but it also emphasized that the Central Hudson approach had "been subject to
some criticism" by members of the Court. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 409-10. And
nowhere did the United Foods majority suggest that the Central Hudson test would be
appropriate or that it was overruling Wileman's conclusion that "lilt was ... error for the
Court of Appeals to rely on Central Hudson for the purpose of testing the constitutionality
of market order assessments for promotional advertising." Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliot, 521 U.S. 457, 474 (1997). Breyer, in dissent, suggested that the special considerations
applicable to commercial speech should also apply to the dissenting mushroom growers,
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. at 426-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting), but concluded that the program
at issue would pass the Central Hudson test, id. at 429-31.
" Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d at 723 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.s. at 566).
10 ld. at 725.
71
ld. at 725-26.
72 Souter, dissenting from Wileman, criticizes the majority for not considering the
second two prongs of the Lehnert test. Wileman, 521 U.s. at 485 (Souter, J., dissenting). But
given the basic premise of the majority's opinion - that non-ideological speech cannot
offend the First Amendment rights of those forced to pay for it - the question of whether
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subsidization decision, Board of Regents v. Southworth, involves a more
73
radical departure.
Southworth considered whether a state university's mandatory student
fees, used to fund the political and ideological speech of student
organizations, violat~d the First Amendment rights of dissenting
74
students - a question that had divided the circuits and given rise to a
75
deluge of student notes. The Seventh Circuit applied the three-part
the speech is ideological or not directly addresses the test's third prong: whether
challenged assessments significantly add to the burdening of free speech. Thus one might
read Wileman not as introducing a special test for commercial speech, but as applying the
general test for compelled speech to argue that the compelled subsidization of strictly
commercial speech cannot run afoul of the First Amendment.
Incredibly, Kennedy's United Foods opinion never even mentions Lehnert. However,
as argued above, the reasoning can be viewed as a modification of the traditional
germaneness test - the first step in Lehnert's three-pronged test. It seems that after United
Foods, an expenditure for expressive activities passes the first prong of the Lehnert test only
if it is germane to the state's legitimate purpose in imposing mandatory payments (the
original criterion) and to a broader program that includes non-expressive components (the
United Foods innovation).
73
Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
74 See id. at 227-28 (citing cases).
75 See, e.g., Donna M. Cote, Comment, The First Amendment and Compulsory Funding of
Student Government Political Resolutions at State Universities, 62 U. CHI. 1. REV. 825 (1995);
Travis Crabtree, Note, Southworth v. Grebe: The Inquisition of the First Amendment, 36
Hous. 1. REV. 1093 (1999); David E. Frank, Note, First Amendment Protection from M1lndatory
Subsidization of Political Speech in Public Colleges and Universities: The Marketplace Just Got a
Lot Less Expensive, 48 DRAKE 1. REV. 359 (2000); Michael J. Hamblin, Note, Southworth v.
Grebe: Why the Seventh Circuit's Decision Was the Correct Response to Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 46 WAYNE 1. REV. 361 (2000); Marita Erbeck
Aimee Hamoy, Survey, Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 120 S.
Ct. 1346 (2000), 11 SETON HALL CONST. 1.J. 211 (2000); Jeff Homer, Commentary, Student
Fees and First Amendment Concerns, 120 Eoue. 1. REP. 911 (1997); Kim Hudson, Comment, To
Fee or Not to Fee: The Use of Mandatory Student Activity Fees to Fund Private Organizations that
Engage in Political or Ideological Speech or Activity, 30 CUMBo 1. REV. 277 (1999-2000); Ryiah
Lilith, Current Event, Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin v. Southworth No.
98-1189, 2000 WL 293217, (U.S. March 22, 2000), 8 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & 1. 809
(2000); Ralph Mawdsley & Steven Permuth, Commentary, Mandatory Student Fees and Free
Speech, 132 Eoue. 1. REP. 265 (1999); Ralph Mawdsley & Steven Permuth, Commentary:
The Supreme Court Upholds Mandatory Student Fees, 145 Eoue. 1. REP. 865 (2000); Meredith R.
Miller, Comment, Southworth V. Grebe: The Conservative Utilization of "Negative" First
Amendment Rights to Attack Diversity of Thought at Public Universities, 65 BROOK. 1. REV. 529
(1999); Monte Arthur Mills, Note, The Student, the First Amendment, and the Mandatory Fee,
85 IOWA 1. REV. 387 (1999); Michael R. O'Neill, California Supreme Court Survey: August
1992 - September 1993, Smith V. Regents of the University of California, 21 PEPP. 1. REV. 287
(1993); Kelly Kathleen Ryan, Note, The Cost of Free Speech: First Amendment Limitations of
Student Activity Funds - Southworth v. Grebe, 83 MARQ. 1. REV. 707 (2000); Christine
Theroux, Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of Mandatory Student Activity Fee Systems: All
Students Benefit, 33 CONN. 1. REV. 691 (2001); Kari Thoe, Note, A Learning Experience:
Discovering the Balance Between Fees-Funded Public Fora and Compelled-Speech Rights at
American Universities, 82 MINN. 1. REV. 1425 (1998); Scott 1. Walker, Note, I'll Speak for

HeinOnline -- 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1102 2004-2005

2005]

A First Amendment Right Against Compelled Subsidization

1103

76
Lehnert test to the question. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the
Lehnert standard - or any other germaneness test - as applied to
student activity fees. The Court argued, first, that the germaneness
standard was too vague to be of much use, as evidenced by the divergent
opinions on the germaneness of union expenditures in Lehnert.77 Second,
the Court maintained that it was particularly inappropriate for courts to
determine what is germane to the mission of a university because such
determinations involve imposing limitations "contrary to the very goal
the University seeks to pursue.,,78 Instead of the three-part Lehnert test,
given that the university had a legitimate interest in funding student
activities, "[t]he proper measure, and the principal standard of
protection for objecting students . . . is the requirement of viewpoint
neutrality in the allocation of funding support.,,79
While Kennedy'S majority opinion in Southworth is dear as to the
reason for the Court's departure from the Lehnert test, it gives little or no
guidance as to whether or when courts should apply the viewpointneutrality test in the future. There are three possible readings. The
narrowest is that the Southworth test applies only to some subset of

Myself Compulsory Speech and the Use of Student Fees at State Universities, 52 RUTGERS L. REV.
341 (1999); Robert L. Waring, Comment, Talk Is Not Cheap: Funded Student Speech at Public
Universities on Trial, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 541 (1995); Matthew 1. Weinstein, Note, I'm Paying for
That? - Assessing the Constitutionality of Mandating Student Activity Fees to Support
Objectionable Political and Ideological Activities at Public Universities in Southworth v. Grebe,
44 VILL. L. REv. 257 (1999); Walter James White, Comment, Exploring the Constitutionality of
Subsidizing Political Speech with Mandatory Student Activity Fees: Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 69 MISS. L.J. 1221 (2000); Carolyn Wiggin,
Note, A Funny Thing Happens When You Pay for a Forum: Mandatory Student Fees to Support
Political Speech at Public Universities, 103 YALE L.J. 2009 (1994). In addition to student notes,
see Robert M. O'Neil, Student Fees and Student Rights: Evolving Constitutional Principles, 25
J.e. & U.L. 569 (1999); Kevin F. O'Shea, First Amendment Cases in Higher Education, 26 J.e. &
U.L. 193 (1999); Roy Whitehead, Jr. & Walter Block, Mandatory Student Fees: Forcing Some to
Pay for the Free Speech of Others, 20 WHITIIER L. REV. 759 (1999).
7. Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 724-33 (7th Cir. 1998).
77
Southworth, 529 U.S. at 232. For a description of the varying opinions in Lehnert, see
infra pp. 1091-09.
78 Id. at 232.
79 Id. at 233; see also id. at 230 ("We decide that the viewpoint neutrality requirement of
the University program is in general sufficient to protect the rights of the objecting
students.").
The test is taken from the Court's public-forum cases, particularly Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.s. 819 (1995) (cited at Southworth, 529 U.s. at
233), which held that a state university's student-activities program created a public forum
and therefore must be administered in a viewpoint-neutral fashion to protect the rights of
potentially excluded groups. See also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229-30 (discussing Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.s. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981».
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compelled subsidization cases.
The opinion's emphasis on the
undesirability of judicial decisions as to what is germane in a university
setting might suggest, for instance, that the viewpoint-neutrality test
applies only where it is difficult or inappropriate for a court to adjudge
germaneness. Along these lines, Leslie Gielow Jacobs has suggested that
the Southworth test should apply only where the purpose of the program
at issue is "to create a public forum for speech and debate," while the
Lehnert test still governs cases where "the government create[s] an
organization to serve a primarily nonspeech function."so
But if viewpoint neutrality provides enough First Amendment
protection in some contexts, why it is it not sufficient in others? That is,
if dissenters' rights were not violated by the viewpoint-neutral
disbursements challenged in Southworth, the same should be true of
other species of viewpoint-neutral disbursements - whether or not
germaneness can be adjudged or even if the program serves "a primarily
nonspeech function."sl Thus a second, more plausible reading is that
Southworth provides an independently sufficient criterion for
constitutional validity: so long as mandatory payments go to a
legitimate governmental program and are distributed in a viewpointneutral manner, they do not violate dissenters' right against compelled
subsidization, whether or not they pass the Lehnert test.
But one cannot ignore the fact that Southworth also criticizes the
germaneness criterion as being too vague to be of any use. This,
combined with the fact that neither Wileman nor United Foods expressly
employed the Lehnert test, suggests a third reading: the Supreme Court
is in the process of abandoning the Lehnert test or any other germaneness
standard. But if this is the case, it is difficult to know what will take
Lehnert's place. So far, the Court has not articulated any new test general
enough to decide the variety of cases that have come before it, not to
mention the other contexts where the doctrine might apply.s2
Jacobs, supra note 9, at 443-44.
In fact, when Jacobs attempts to explain why constitutional scrutiny was appropriate
in the union and integrated bar cases, she recurs to the potential "skewing of the
marketplace of ideas," a mode of argument that a broader reading of Southworth's
viewpoint neutrality test captures. Id. at 443; see infra pp. 145-46.
82
Wasserman faults Southworth's viewpoint-neutrality test as opening the floodgates
to as-applied challenges to legitimate government sponsored public forms. Wasserman,
supra note 23, at 217-19, 228-31. His argument consists of two parts. First, because a
requirement of mere facial neutrality could be easily skirted, the Southworth test must look
to the actual application of the program, from which it follows that "a single
viewpoint-discriminatory decision, even one made in disregard for the plain,
viewpoint-neutral language of the program regulations, is sufficient to render the program
viewpoint-discriminatory and to trigger the objector's right." Id. at 217. Second, because
80
81
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Even without a single, generally applicable test for when compelled
subsidization violates the First Amendment, the Court might have
provided some per se rules for specific categories of expenditures. Over
the years, two viable candidates for such rules have emerged:
expenditures for political and ideological activities and expenditures for
commercial advertising. But - and this is yet another weakness of the
current doctrine-the Court has failed to settle on a rule for either.
The decisions leading up to and including Lehnert might be read to
stand at least for the proposition that the compelled subsidization of
political and ideological speech is, as such, impermissible. Abood and
Keller suggested that in the contexts of the union shop and integrated
bar, political or ideological expenditures were per se unconstitutional.
Lehnert, the next case to consider such expenditures, allowed certain
nonpolitical union outlays, but found that each of the challenged
political expenditures failed its three-part test. And, in fact, the Court
has never found ~olitical or ideological expenditures germane to a
legitimate purpose and has said that such uses pose a particularly
84
heavy burden on dissenters' freedom of expression.

the right against compelled subsidization adheres in every payer, Southworth gives
standing to anyone required to pay for the public forum, whereas under the public forum
doctrine only those excluded have standing. Id. at 218-19, 229-30. He concludes:
The reliance on viewpoint neutrality in evaluating objecting payers' rights
produces the perverse result of an overall decrease in the amount of speech, [if]
government makes a single improper Viewpoint-discriminatory denial of access,
it now must refund some portion of the collected funds to any objecting payer or
payers ... By contrast, the ordinary remedy where a speaker unconstitutionally
is denied access to a public forum is to require government to admit that speaker
to the forum; this broadens access and increases the sum total of expression
facilitated by the forum and available in the marketplace.

Id. at 230. But damages for a successful compelled subsidization challenge are relatively
small - a refund of a portion of the exacted funds in proportion that the prohibited
expenditures bear to total expenditures. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
237-42 (1977). As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that this amount will be enough
either to over-incentivize litigation or to undermine legitimate expressive programs.
83 See Ferris Faculty Ass'n v. Lehnert, 500 U.S. 507, 527, 528-29 (1991); Keller v. State
Bar of Cal., 496 U.s. I, 14 (1990); Chi. Teachers Union, Local No.1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,
294 (1986); Abood, 431 U.s. at 235; Bhd. of Ry. & S.s. Clerks, v. Allen, 373 U.s. 113, 121
(1963); inri Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740, 768 (1961). But see Lehnert, 500 U.S.
at 535-37 (Marshall, }., dissenting) (arguing that union lobbying activities are germane to
collective bargaining); Street, 367 U.S. at 811 (Frankfurter, }., dissenting) (arguing "the
practical necessity for unions to participate in what as a matter of analytical fragmentation
may be called political activities").
84
See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 522 ("Where the subject of compelled speech [sic] is the
discussion of governmental affairs, which is at the core of our First Amendment freedoms,
the burden upon dissenters' rights extends far beyond the acceptance of the agency shop
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Southworth, however, forecloses any per se rule. The student fees at
issue in that case unquestionably went to pay for the political and
ideological activities of student organizations,85 yet the Court held that so
long as the funds were distributed in a viewpoint-neutral manner,
dissenting students' First Amendment rights were adequately protected.
Now, one might want to distinguish Southworth as applying a different
test than Lehnert and other cases. But once one allows that the compelled
subsidization of political and ideological activities can pass the
Southworth test, there is much less reason to assume that they must fail a
germaneness, or any other, standard. And certainly after Southworth it
cannot be argued that such expenditures automatically violate the First
Amendment.
The other candidate for a per se rule is mandatory payments for
commercial speech.
Wileman attempted to establish such a rule,
concluding that the compelled subsidization of commercial advertising
cannot give rise to a crisis of conscience and, as a result, cannot violate
86
the First Amendment. In fact, Wileman suggests that only "political or
ideological disagreement with the content of a message" can meet the
crisis-of-consciousness test,S7 from which would follow a per se rule
covering all nonpolitical and non-ideological activities. United Foods,
however, rejected such a rule even for commercial speech. According to
United Foods, Wileman's crisis-of-conscience test is unprincipled and

and is constitutionally impermissible." (citations omitted».
85 The student organizations to which dissenting students objected included the
International Socialist Organization, the College Democrats, the College Republicans, a
student environmental group, a community legal office and the Wisconsin Student Public
Interest Research Group. Southworth, 529 U.s. at 223. The plaintiffs alleged, and the
university admitted, that those organizations engaged in "political and ideological
expression." ld. at 224, 227.
86 Prior to
Wileman, the Court's rulings concerning nonpolitical, non-ideological
expenditures suggested that there was no per se rule for that category. Ellis, the first case to
consider nonpolitical expenditures, held that some union expenditures for nonpolitical,
non-ideological activities (organizing efforts and litigation not related to the bargaining
unit in question) were not germane to collective bargaining, but that others (conventions
and union publications) were both germane and sufficiently supported by the
government's interest to pass First Amendment scrutiny. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.s. 448, 448-51 (1976). Lehnert, applying a somewhat more stringent test, found
constitutional all of the nonpolitical, non-ideological expenditures that dissenting
employees challenged (litigation supporting the collective bargaining efforts of other
bargaining units, internal nonpolitical publications, support of parent organizations, and
expenses incident to strike preparation). Lehnert, 500 U.s. at 527-32. Together, these
opinions suggest that expenditures for nonpolitical, non-ideological speech must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, applying the general standards governing compelled
subsidization.
87 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457,472 (1997).
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dissenting payers' mere disagreement with the subsidized speech is
enough to trigger First Amendment scrutiny.88 At the very least, this
means that the commercial character of subsidized expression cannot
exempt a program from scrutiny. And this reasoning might even be
extended to argue against any per se rule for political and ideological
expenditures. If there is no principled distinction between the First
Amendment harm created by political or ideological expenditures and
that created by nonpolitical, non-ideological speech,89 and if the
compelled subsidization of some non-ideological speech is permissible
(see Ellis, Lehnert, and Wileman), then so might the compelled
subsidization of some political and ideological speech. Given the sharp
divergence between Wileman and United Foods, the status of the
compelled subsidization of commercial expression remains unclear, as
does the status of expenditures for nonpolitical, non-ideological speech
in general.
A final difficulty with the current state of the doctrine is the
unprincipled character of the United Foods decision. In order to avoid
overruling Wileman, Kennedy's majority opinion distinguishes it based
on the idea that there is a greater First Amendment harm where
compelled payments fund a purely expressive program than where they
90
fund a program that has non-expressive components. This claim also
stands behind the ruling in the case - because the Mushroom Council
engaged primarily in expressive activities, the program violated
dissenting industry members' First Amendment right against compelled
subsidization. But, as Breyer pointed out in dissent, this approach is
problematic both in principle and in its practical consequences. As a
matter of principle, it is perverse to hold that the more heavily regulated
91
an industry is, the less First Amendment protection its members have.

United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,411 (2001).
Id. at 410-11 ("The subject matter of the speech may be of interest to but a small
segment of the population; yet those whose business and livelihood depend in some way
upon the product involved no doubt deem First Amendment protection to be just as
important for them as it is for other discrete, little noticed groups in a society which values
the freedom resulting from speech in all its diverse parts ... First Amendment values are at
serious risk if the government can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of
citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors; and there is no
apparent principle which distinguishes out of hand minor debates about whether a
branded mushroom is better than just any mushroom.").
88

89

90

Id.at411-12.
Id. at 422 (Breyer,

J., dissenting) ("Compared with traditional 'command and
control,' price, or output regulation, [the challenged] regulation - which relies upon selfregulation through industry trade associations and upon the dissemination of information
- is more consistent, not less consistent, with producer choice. It is difficult to see why a
91
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As a practical matter, the distinction gives regulators who want to use
compelled fees to pay for commercial advertisement an incentive to
increase the level of regulation, to add non-expressive components (price
or output controls, grading, certification, and so forth) in order to avoid
92
More fundamentally, the majority in
the holding of United Foods.
United Foods gives no reason why this distinction should make a
difference in the outcome of compelled subsidization cases. The
distinction is not connected to the machinery of First Amendment
93
analysis and, as such, is untenable.
The current confusion in the doctrine can be summarized as follows.
In 1991, Lehnert provided a seemingly clear test - challenged
expenditures must be germane to a vital governmental interest and not
significantly add to the burden on dissenters' free speech interests
inherent in the program. In practice, however, the Lehnert standard is
difficult to apply, because the Court has specified neither how
"germane" an expenditure must be nor what free speech interests
payments burden.
Nine years later, Southworth introduced a
fundamentally different standard - compelled payments for the
expressive activities of others do not violate dissenters' First Amendment
rights so long as the state has a legitimate purpose in imposing the
payments and funds are distributed in a viewpoint-neutral manner. But
Southworth leaves it unclear whether its viewpoint-neutrality test is
meant to apply only to some cases, to serve as an independent test for
constitutionality, or to be the first step towards replacing the unworkable
Lehnert standard. Nor do Wileman and United Foods provide any
indication of the continuing relevance of the Lehnert test or its
predecessors. Instead, both introduce additional considerations whether the qisputed activities might cause a crisis of conscience and
whether compelled payments also fund non-expressive activities without clarifying how they fit in with any general standard or should

Constitution that seeks to protect individual freedom would consider the absence of 'heavy
regulation' to amount to a special determinative reason for refusing to permit this less
intrusive program." (citation omitted)).
92
ld. at 429 (arguing that Court's decision "creates an incentive to increase the
Government's involvement in any information-based regulatory program.").
93 With respect to commercial speech, the Supreme Court has held that "the State's
power to regulate commercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate
commercial speech that is 'linked inextricably' to those transactions." 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.s. 484, 499 (1996) (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)).
But United Foods does not suggest that there must be an inextricable link between the
generic industry advertising and the requisite non-expressive components of the program.
And there does not seem to have been such a link in the program at issue in Wileman.
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94

be reconciled with each other. Nor has the Court adhered to any per se
rules about certain categories of expenditures. Political or ideological
speech at one time looked as if it might always violate the First
Amendment rights of dissenting payers, but cannot be the basis for a per
se rule after Southworth. And while Wileman suggested that commercial
speech could never give rise to a First Amendment problem, the Court in
United Foods rejected such a rule only four years later. Lastly, it is
difficult to know what to make of the United Foods emphasis on whether
compelled subsidization is part of a broader regulatory program with
non-expressive elements.
II.

PROBLEMS IN 'THEORY: 'THE COURT'S FAILURE TO EXPLAIN THE
DOCTRINE

Many of the practical problems with the doctrine can be traced back to
the Supreme Court's failure to settle on a coherent account of why the
compelled subsidization of the speech of others implicates the First
Amendment. This part examines two separate arguments that justices
have used to explain the First Amendment right not to subsidize, one
based on dissenters' freedom of belief and the other on freedom of
expression. Both posit harms to the First Amendment rights of
individual payers. Neither is satisfactory.95 Part III proposes an
alternative account of the right not to subsidize, according to which
compelled subsidization raises First Amendment issues not because of a
harm to individual dissenters, but because of the risk of improper
governmental interference in public political discourse.
It is useful to approach the two claimed harms to individual dissenters
by way of the now well-established and better-understood First
Amendment right against compelled speech - one's right not to be
forced to express a message oneself, as opposed to paying for the
message of another. The Supreme Court's early compelled speech
decisions reflected the idea that compelled speech violates dissenters'
freedom of belief. Later decisions have focused on the effects of
" Lawrence Tribe has made a similar point about Wileman and Southworth, which, he
argues, have been left "to drift awhile beyond the broad current otherwise running through
the cases, until later decisions hopefully steer both precedents into the mainstream."
Lawrence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L.
REV. 641, 647 (2001). Presumably Tribe would consider the result in United Foods to be a
step back in the correct direction, as he successfully represented the plaintiffs before the
Supreme Court in that case. Id. at 646 n.36.
95 For a similar thesis, supported by somewhat different arguments, see Cantor, supra
note 23, at 14-29. It is unfortunate that Cantor's thoughtful early analysis of the issues
involved in compelled subsidization has largely been lost on the courts.
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compelled speech on dissenters' expressive capacities. A number of
commentators have suggested that compelled subsidization is merely a
species of compelled speech.96 The argument in this part is that the
compelled subsidization of the speech 'of others causes individual
dissenters none of the First Amendment harms caused by compelled
speech. Nor has the Court provided an alternative account of the First
Amendment harm, leaving the compelled subsidization doctrine
essentially adrift.
A.

Does Compelled Subsidization Violate Dissenters' Freedom of Belief?

When describing the First Amendment right against compelled
subsidization, the Court and individual justices have repeatedly invoked
Thomas Jefferson's statements that "to compel a man to furnish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.,,97 Justice Stevens's Wileman opinion
explained the freedom-of-belief argument as follows:
[C]ompelled contributions for political purposes unrelated to
collective bargaining implicated First Amendment interests because
they interfere with the values lying at the "heart of the First
Amendment ... the notion that an individual should be free to
believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
State.,,98

96
See Greene, supra note 23; Kamenshine, supra note 23. Jacobs also assimilates the
compelled speech and compelled subsidization doctrines, though Jacobs doesn't explain
the one in terms of the other, but attempts to reform both together. Jacobs, supra note 23;
see also Wasserman, supra note 23, at 169-90 (treating compelled subsidization and
compelled speech as subcategories of "compelled expression"); id. at 205-06 ("The right at
issue [in compelled subsidization] is to refrain from speaking and the sole point is that an
individual should not be forced to support private speech.").
97
Jefferson, supra note 10, at xvii, quoted in Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 10
(1990); Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306 n.15 (1986); Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,235 n.31 (1977); int'I Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740, 779
n.4 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 790 (Black, J., dissenting).
Another common quotation is Madison's observation that "the same authority
which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of
anyone establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever." II James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901), quoted in Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306
n.15; Abood, 431 U.s. at 235 n.31; Street, 367 U.s. at 779 n.4 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
790 (Black, J., dissenting).
98 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457, 472 (1997) (quoting Abood, 431 U.s.
at 234-35); see also id. at 471 ("Abood merely recognized a First Amendment interest in not
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Compelled subsidization supposedly interferes with freedom of belief
because it forces dissenting payers to act in a way contrary to their
consciences. But on closer examination, it is impossible to see how
compelled payments - even when used for speech - present a
distinctively First Amendment harm to dissenters' freedom of belief. To
see why this is so, it is helpful to begin with the threat that compelled
speech poses to freedom of belief.
It is possible to frame matters so that it is not obvious why requiring
someone even to voice certain words - much less requiring her to pay
for someone else to voice those words - interferes with her freedom of
belief. We all know that what a person says need not correspond to
what she believes, especially when she is forced to say it. Think of the
Hollywood prisoner of war, forced to state his allegiance to the enemy,
but in his heart remaining true to his own country. Or Huck Finn,
dutifully reciting his prayers at the Widow Douglas's house, while
secretly questioning the coherence of her faith.
Moreover, compelled speech is hardly the only way that the
government requires people to act contrary to their beliefs. Catholic
charities may be required to pay for insurance that covers
99
contraceptives. Tax laws demand that everyone earning more than a
specified amount pay income tax, regardless of whether they agree with
loo
the government programs funded by their tax dollars.
More broadly,

being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with
one's 'freedom of belief."'); Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36 ("The fact that the appellants are
compelled to make, rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political
purposes works no less an infringement on their constitutional rights. For at the heart of
the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will,
and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience
rather than coerced by the state."); Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 874 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting) ("At stake here is the interest of the individual lawyers of Wisconsin in having
full freedom to think their own thoughts, speak their own minds, support their own causes
and wholeheartedly fight whatever they are against."); Street, 367 U.s. at 776 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that compelled subsidization requires dissenters "to surrender ...
matters of conscience, belief or expression"); id. at 788 (Black, J., dissenting) (concluding
that compelled subsidization violates individual dissenters' rights to "think, speak, write
and worship as they wish").
99
See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 95 (Cal.
2004); Inimai M. Chettiar, Comment, Contraceptive Coverage Laws: Eliminating Gender
Discrimination or Infringing on Religious Liberties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1867 (2002).
100 Powell, concurring in Abood, suggested that "[c]ompelled support of a private
association is fundamentally different from compelled support of government" because
"government is representative of the people" and "[t]he same cannot be said of a union,
which is representative only of one segment of the population, with certain common
interests." Abood, 431 U.s. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring). As Tribe pOints out, this
argument is unsatisfactory. "[S]ince the authority of the public employees' union to
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virtually every coercive law - from child welfare laws to workforce
safety regulations to speed limits - is open to the objection that it will
force some people to act against what they believe best. If compelled
speech involves a special First Amendment harm to freedom of belief, it
must be distinguished from these other forms of government coercion.
We need a fuller account of just how compelled speech, and then also of
how the compelled subsidization of the speech of others, threatens
freedom of belief.
The early compelled speech cases suggest two possible answers to the
first question: compelled speech threatens freedom of belief, first, when
it is used as a tool of indoctrination and, second, when it interferes with
the free exercise of belief. The first Supreme Court decision to recognize
a First Amendment right against compelled speech, West Virginia v.
Barnette, emphasized indoctrination.!01 West Virginia had required
102
school children to salute the flag, else face expulsion.
The plaintiffs
were Jehovah's Witnesses and considered saluting the flag contrary to
their religious duties.!03 The majority posed the question as whether
104
state indoctrination was consistent with the Constitution.
With
National Socialism looming in the background, the Court held:
Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public
opinion by authority. . . If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of oginion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein. 5
When the state compels speech in the service of indoctrination, it
threatens the citizenry's freedom of belief and infringes on its First
Amendment rights.
The other way compelled speech can interfere with freedom of belief is
when it prevents a person from exercising or acting on her beliefs in
compel support is derived from the legislature, the cases seem hard to distinguish on any
private-public ground." LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 808 n.14
(2d ed. 1988). Nor can Powell's distinction explain the outcome in Southworth, in which
funds again went to private groups. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.s. 217 (2000).
Finally, Powell's argument does not isolate what is special about the compelled
subsidization of private speech - why it is different from, say, the harm to the committed
Catholic of being required to pay into a health insurance plan that pays for birth control.
101
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
102 Id. at 626-29.
103
Id. at 629.
104
Id. at 640-42.
105

[d.
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some important way. This aspect was also present in Barnette, where the
plaintiffs argued that saluting the flag interfered with their commitment
to Exodus 20:4-5 ("Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image ...
nor bow down thyself to them nor serve them.,,).I06 Interference with
o7
freedom of belief was also central to the decision in Wooley v. Maynard/
the Court's next significant compelled speech case. Wooley considered a
Jehovah's Witness's objection to New Hampshire's requirement that his
license plate display the motto "Live Free or Die," which he found
"morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent.,,108
New
Hampshire's license plate was clearly not an attempt to indoctrinate (a
driver rarely sees her own license plate). Nonetheless, the Court found
the requirement unconstitutional: "The First Amendment protects the
right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority
and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea
they find morally objectionable."I09 The interference with freedom of
belief here was not in the form of indoctrination, but in preventing the
plaintiff from acting in accordance with his most deeply held
convictions, which in this case required that he not display the state
motto.
So, these are two ways the Court has identified in which compelled
speech can interfere with the freedom of belief. The next question is
whether compelled subsidization of speech interferes with belief in either
of these ways. (If there is another sort of interference with dissenters'
freedom of belief, proponents of the doctrines have yet to identify it.)
Indoctrination is the simpler case. Compelled speech can serve as a tool
of indoctrination because requiring a person - especially a schoolchild
- to repeat a message can eventually cause her to believe it. Because
compelled subsidization does not require dissenters to repeat any
message, it is a poor tool for indoctrination. As Justice Harlan noted in
Lathrop, there can be no "desire to induce belief or conviction by the
device of forcing a person to identify himself with the expression of such
views ... where the connection between the payment of an individual's
dues and the views to which he objects is factually so remote."no
If there is a coherent argument that compelled subsidization violates
dissenters' freedom of belief, it is that it interferes with their ability to
exercise, realize, or act on their beliefs, in the way Wooley emphasized.
106
107

loa
109
110

[d. at 629.

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.s. 705, 713-14 (1977).
Id. at 713.
Id. at 715.
Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 859 (1961) (Harlan, I., concurring).
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The argument must be that by requiring someone to pay for a message
with which she disagrees, compelled subsidization requires her to act
contrary to her own beliefs in a way that violates the protections of the
First Amendment. But, as noted above, one might object to virtually
every form of state compulsion on similar grounds. We still must
identify some uniquely relevant harm caused by forcing someone to
speak or to pay for the speech of others - a harm distinct from the
interference with belief that potentially accompanies all state
compulsion.
One can read Wileman's "crisis of conscience" test as an attempt to
Ill
establish such a limiting principle.
But only four years later, United
Foods reversed course and rejected this test as unprincipled. l12 And it is
true that the crisis-of-conscience line is not so bright as one might hope.
But the real problem with Wileman's proposed standard is not that it is
vague, but that it does not indicate what is special about the compelled
subsidization of speech. Even if we allow that being required to support
a message one disagrees with can create a crisis of conscience, so might
being required to pay for a non-expressive activity or, for that matter, to
engage in or refrain from other non-expressive acts. This is not a
principle that distinguishes a special threat posed by the compelled
subsidization of speech.
One clear constitutional boundary is the line around cases where
dissenters' religious beliefs are at stake. If the free speech clause does not
draw the line here, the free exercise clause does. It is telling that the
plaintiffs both in Barnette and in Wooley were Jehovah's Witnesses and
objected to the required speech acts on religious grounds. This is also
the point of Jefferson's statement, often quoted out of context and in
support of the compelled subsidization doctrine, that "to compel a man
to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which
he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical."ll3 The sentence comes from
Jefferson's Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and concerns only the
compelled subsidization of religious activities, gesturing toward the link
between the anti-establishment and free exercise principles. When the
state compels a person to do something contrary to her religiOUS beliefs,

Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521' U.S. 457,472 (1997).
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001).
113 Jefferson, supra note 10, at xvii. For compelled subsidization decisions that appeal to
Jefferson's statement, and a similar one from Madison, both out of context, see Chi.
Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.s. 292, 306 n.15 (1986); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 235 n.31 (1977); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740, 779 n.4 (1961)
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 790 (Black, J., dissenting).
l\l

112
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regardless of whether the requirement is that she speak, pay money for
speech, or engage in some conduct with no relation to speech, the First
Amendment is clearly implicated and the state action is subject to
constitutional scrutiny.
Yet, this is insufficient to ground either the right against compelled
speech or the right against the compelled subsidization of the speech of
others. Each requires an argument both narrower and broader than the
free exercise principle. The argument must be narrower because these
rights are supposed to apply only to compulsion to engage in or to fund
expressive activities, while the free exercise interest extends to any
compelled action that goes against one's religious beliefs. It must be
broader because these rights are meant to apply also where dissenters'
objections are purely secular.
Here is an answer for compelled speech: The requirement that a
speaker herself give voice to a message can impinge on her beliefs religious or not - in a distinctive way because it is often central to our
114
most deeply held beliefs that we be able to express them in words.
This is true whether those beliefs are religious, political, moral, or
otherwise central to our self-identity. Forcing a person to express a
message contrary to such beliefs can thus threaten her ability to control
what she tells the world about who she is and what she holds important.
The principle here is narrower in the necessary way, for it highlights
what is special about speech or expression, and therefore answers the
objection that the government requires people to do all sorts of nonexpressive things that they disagree with. It is also broader than the free
exercise principle in the right way, for it is not limited to religious dissent
from the required message. This is how the First Amendment right

114
Abner Greene emphasizes this sort of harm in his account of the First Amendment's
prohibition on compelled speech:

My proposal here is that compelled speech cases ... should be seen as autonomy
or personhood cases . . .. Just as it would be hard to justify a governmental
requirement that everyone wear blue on Fridays, or that everyone eat ice cream
once a week, so it is hard to justify a governmental requirement that everyone
say the pledge of allegiance. The concern in the pledge of allegiance situation,
thus, is centered not on the speech involved, but rather on the intrusion on and
insult to the person and the weakness of the regulatory need.
Greene, supra note 23, at 481; see also Paul G. Stem, Note, A Pluralistic Reading of the First
Amendment and its Relation to Public Discourse, 99 YALE 1.J. 925,935-36 (1990) (arguing that
ability to speak freely is essential to freedom of belief because "[s]peaking with others
about their rival values and ideals is ... constitutively linked to the possibility of an
individual agent exercising a deliberative choice of how she wants to live").
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against compelled speech can be grounded in the freedom of belief.
But does this argument, or one like it, carryover to the compelled
subsidization of the speech of others? It does not, and for two reasons.
First, the compelled act itself - paying a mandatory fee - has too little
moral content. The point can be made by way of analogy. We recognize
the conscientious objector's right not to carry a gun, but not her right not
to pay taxes that fund the military.1l6 One reason for this difference is
that we do not consider the act of paying taxes to touch on her beliefs in
1I7
the same way that military service would.
Similarly, the mere act of
paying for an objectionable message interferes less with a dissenter's
beliefs than would being forced to express that message herself. Like the
taxpaying conscientious objector, she is not required to engage in the
very activities she finds objectionable. This distinction is not an a priori
moral truth - a radical consequentialist might refuse to recognize any
difference between these cases. But ours is not such a morality. The
difference between paying for and doing reflects a real difference in our
attitudes towards these different categories of compulsion. Among other
things, we find that it interferes more with a person's ability to act in
accordance with her beliefs when she is required to do something she
considers intrinsically wrong than when she is required to underwrite
someone else's acts that she believes wrong.
The second reason why compelled subsidization does not interfere
with freedom of belief is the semantic gulf between the act of paying and
the speech it helps fund. Compelling a person to express a message
herself presents a particular sort of threat to her freedom of belief. It
threatens her ability to control what she tells the world about who she is
and what she holds important - forms of expression that can trigger the
First Amendment because they are essential to realizing certain deeply
held beliefs. The requirement that a person do no more than pay for a
message she disagrees with does not threaten this sort of harm. I touch
on a theme here that will be explored at greater length in the next part of
this Article, which discusses dissenters' expressive interests. But, the
thesis can be stated now: The mere act of paying a mandatory
assessment does not identify the payer with the message her payments

lIS Whether it explainS the Court's compelled speech cases is a question that need not
be answered here. It is enough to show that it is a coherent way of thinking about
compelled speech as a special threat to freedom of belief.
116
See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).
117 See id. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that in instance like tax case,
"almost insurmountable burden" should be placed on objector who claims that
governmental compulsion conflicts with religious beliefs).
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help fund. No one mistakes that act for an expression of belief. There is
no signifier-signified relationship. Consequently, the mere act of paying
does not interfere with the dissenter's ability to express her beliefs.
While she may object to the requirement that she fund the message, any
harm she suffers is not a distinctively First Amendment harm. liB
The claim that compelled subsidization of the speech of others
infringes on dissenters' First Amendment freedom of belief is ultimately
untenable. Compelled subsidization is not a tool of indoctrination. Nor
does it interfere with dissenters' ability to practice or realize their beliefs
in any distinctively First Amendment way. Justice Harlan put the point
as follows: "Of course it is disagreeable to see a group, to which one has
been required to contribute, decide to spend its money for purposes the
contributor opposes. But the Constitution does not protect against the
119
If the compelled subsidization
mere play of personal emotions.
doctrine is grounded in a First Amendment harm to individual
dissenters, that harm must be of a different sort.
11

B.

Does Compelled Subsidization Interfere with Dissenters' Freedom of
Speech?

The other argument that the Court and individual justices have put
forward in support of the doctrine is that compelled subsidization
interferes with dissenters' ability to speak - that it involves the same
sort of expressive harm that compelled speech does. The argument goes
back to Black's and Douglasis 1961 opinions in International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street and Lathrop v. Donahue,120 though it gained
11' Wasserman, who advocates a freedom-of-belief type argument, argues that the First
Amendment harm of compelled subsidization does not turn on a public connection
between the funder and the message funded because "[t]he dignitary interest in freedom of
conscience rests on an inward focus on the individual's own mind," not "how the
reasonable outside world views or understands the message and the individual's
connection to it." Wasserman, supra note 23, at 206. But without a semantic nexus,
Wasserman cannot explain what is special about the compelled subsidization of speech, as
opposed to payments for non-expressive activities. From the point of view of the
individual payer, funding non-expressive activities can cause just as much dignitary harm
as funding speech. Wasserman does suggest that courts limit the compelled subsidization
doctrine to instances where payments fund expression. [d. at 201-02, 207. But he has no
principled argument for this restriction, appealing instead to the practical need to cabin the
doctrine so as to protect the government's ability to use tax dollars as it will and to the First
Amendment interest in increasing the total amount of speech. [d. at 196-200.
119
Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.s. 820, 857 (1961) (Harlan, L concurring),
120
See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (1961) (Black, L dissenting)
("Compelling a man by law to pay his money to elect candidates or advocate laws or
doctrines he is against differs only in degree, if at all, from compelling him by law to speak
for a candidate, a party, or a cause he is against."); Lathrop, 367 U.s. at 882 (Douglas, J.,
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momentum after Buckley v. Valeo,l21 which held inter alia that limitations
on campaign contributions "implicate fundamental First Amendment
interests."l22 In its simplest form, the argument goes like this: Buckley
established that contributors have an expressive interest in being able to
give money to election campaigns and held that the government may no
more restrict payments for the speech of others than it may restrict
speech itself. It follows that to compel payments for the speech of others
threatens dissenters' freedom of expression just as much as compelling
them to speak. In sh~rt, compelled subsidization is a species of
l23
compelled speech and subject to the same constitutional protections.
Stated so simply, one of the argument's flaws is obvious: Buckley and
the campaign finance cases that followed have not provided campaign
contributions the same level of First Amendment protection afforded to
political speech. Buckley held that, unlike speech, the "quantity of
commutation by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the
size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.,,124 The Court concluded
that contributors did not have the same expressive interest in their
contributions that speakers have in the words they utter. It therefore
upheld contribution limits, though analogous restrictions on how much
a speaker could say would clearly be unconstitutional. If Buckley stands
for anything, it is that payments for speech, while enjoying some degree
of First Amendment protection, are not speech. The state may restrict
payments for the speech of others in ways that it is not permitted to
dissenting) (emphasizing "the inroads of an integrated bar on the liberty and freedom of
lawyers to espouse such causes as they choose").
121
See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457, 504 n.1 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1,9-10 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977); id. at 255-56 (Powell, J., concurring). Lehnert also drew the
connection between compelled subsidization and compelled speech, though it did not
mention Buckley. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.s. 507, 516-17 (1991) (citing Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
122 Buckley v. Valejo, 424 U.S. 1,23 (1976) (cited in Abood, 431 U.s. at 234). McConnell
does not expressly depart from this view, though it does minimize the expressive value of a
campaign contribution for the contributor, as opposed to the candidate receiving it. See
Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 135 ("Because the communicative value of large contributions inheres
mainly in their ability to facilitate the speech of their recipients, we have said that
contribution limits impose serious burdens on free speech only if they are so low as to
'preven[tj candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for
effective advocacy.'" (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21)).
12.3 Accord Wileman, 521 U.S. at 478-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
124 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. But see Nixon v. Shrink, 528 U.S. 377,414 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("In Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Camm., 470
U.S. 480 ... (1985), we cast aside the argument that a contribution does not represent the
constitutionally protected speech of a contributor .... ").
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restrict speech itself.
A close reading of Buckley reveals a second, methodological error in
the above argument. The Buckley Court reached its conclusion only after
closely examining the particular expressive potential of campaign
contributions, that is, their semantic content. Whether payment for the
speech of others also triggers the protections of the compelled speech
doctrine can be decided only by further engaging in this essentially
interpretive task, only through a close examination of the particular
125
expressive interests at stake. There is no simple syllogism from the fact
that an activity has some expressive content, and therefore warrants
some First Amendment protection, to the conclusion that it deserves the
full First Amendment panoply.
Let us therefore return to the basics of compelled speech and how it
interferes with dissenters' expressive interests (as opposed to their
freedom of belief).
While the Supreme Court's early decisions
emphasized the ways in which compelled speech can burden freedom of
belief, later decisions have emphasized dissenters' ability to speak. Once
we have a clear picture of how compelled speech interferes with
dissenters' expressive interests, we can then ask whether compelled
subsidization causes a similar harm.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wooley v. Maynard, and its holding that
New Hampshire's license plate requirement was constitutionally
impermissible, sharpens the compelled speech question. Rehnquist's
argument was that a compulsory license plate motto simply was not
speech.
What the Court does not demonstrate is that there is any "speech"
or "speaking" in the context of this case. . . . The issue,
unconfronted by the Court, is whether appellees, in displaying, as
they are required to do, state license tags, the format of which is
known to all as having been prescribed by the State, would be
126
considered to be advocating political or ideological views.

125 This more particularized approach can be contrasted with that taken by jacobs's
analysis of the link between the compelled subsidization and campaign contribution limits.
Jacobs argues that the First Amendment harm is the same in both contexts - "the
marketplace of ideas effect rather than . . . any abstract assessment of the degree of
individual autonomy impingement" that brings the First Amendment into play. Jacobs,
supra note 9, at 455. But restrictions on campaign contributions may well entail individual
harms (the ability of the contributor to express her support for a candidate in her chosen
medium) that compelled subsidization of speech does not.
126 Wooley, 430 U.s. at 720-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Abner Greene advocates a
similar analysis of whether compelled speech counts as speech at alL Greene, supra note 23,
at 473-75. Rehnquist, however, has probably since abandoned this position. See Boy Scouts
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There are two ideas at work here. First, Rehnquist is saying that what
matters is whether the dissenter is likely to be identified or associated
with the message she is required to carry. Second, he insinuates that so
long as it is common knowledge that she is compelled to carry the
message, no one will interpret her words as an expression of her opinion.
Thus Rehnquist concludes that "[t]he State has not forced appellees to
'say' anything. ,,127 If compelled "speech" is not really speech for First
Amendment purposes, then how can it possibly burden the expressive
interests protected by the First Amendment?
The Wooley majority did not answer Rehnquist's objection. As
discussed above, the majority opinion emphasized the interference with
the dissenter's freedom of belief, as opposed to her ability to speak.
Consequently, the Court rejected the underlying premise of Rehnquist's
128
argument.
But subsequent compelled speech cases have addressed
Rehnquist's challenge and have held that, in most cases, the sina qua non
of a First Amendment compelled speech problem is a strong likelihood
that the compelled message will be associated with the person required to
carry it.
Just three years after Wooley, a majority of the Court agreed with the
first premise of Rehnquist's analysis. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins
concerned a shopping center owner's objection to California's
requirement that petitioners be allowed to use the public spaces in the
129
shopping center to gather signatures.
Rehnquist's majority opinion
found no First Amendment violation and explained that result as
follows:
Most important, the shopping center by choice of its owner is ... a
business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as
they please. The views expressed by members of the public in
passing out pamphlets or seeing signatures for a petition thus will
l30
not likely be identified with those of the owner.

of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.s. 640, 653 (2000) ("Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the
very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the
world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.").
127
Wooley, 430 U.s. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
128
ld. at 7l6-17.
129 Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 74 (1980).
130 ld. at 87 (emphasis added); see also id. at 99 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[S]peech
interests are affected when listeners are likely to identify opinions expressed by members
of the public on commercial property as the views of the owner."); Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1,12 (1986) ("PruneYard ... does not undercut the proposition that
forced associations that burden protected speech are impermiSSible."). Chief Justice
Rehnquist also found it Significant that no specific message was dictated and that the
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PruneYard, however, drops the second idea in Rehnquist's Wooley dissent

- the idea that a compelled message will never be identified with its
carrier. It is replaced by an empirical inquiry into context and meaning.
This inquiry asks whether this is the sort of situation in which observers
are likely to identify the message with the person forced to carry it. The
case of the shopping center does not meet this test, but other cases might.
Thus in a concurring opinion, Justice Powell explained that in a different
case, compelled identification with a message might interfere with a
dissenter's expressive interests, because it would put him in a bind:
either say nothing, in which case he "has been compelled to affirm
someone else's belief," or disavow the compelled message, in which case
he "has been compelled to speak when [he] would prefer to remain
t ,,131
S1'1 en.
In its two major compelled-speech cases since Prune Yard, the Supreme
Court has maintained this approach.132 In Pacific Gas and Electric v. Public
Utilities Commission of California, the Court held that a requirement that a
public utility place the newsletter of a third party in its billing envelope
133
Powell's plurality opinion follows the
violated the First Amendment.
logic of PruneYard, but concludes that in the case of a billing envelope,
unlike a shopping mall, there is a "forced association with potentially
l34
hostile views" that violates the First Amendment right to remain silent.
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, a
owner could expressly disavow any connection with the message. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at
87.
131 PruneYard, 447 U.s. at 99 (Powell, J., concurring).
132
See also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.s. 622, 655-56 (1994) (Cable must-carry
provisions do not force messages on cable operators, because there is "little risk that cable
viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas
or messages endorsed by the cable operator.").
133
Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 20-21 (1986).
134 rd. at 18; see also id. at 15 (requirement "impermissibly requires [the utility] to
associate with speech with which [it] may disagree); id. at 20-21 ("the Commission's order
impermissibly burdens appellant's First Amendment rights because it forced appellant to
associate with the views of other speakers .... ").
Justice Burger concurred, agreeing with the relevance of the possible identification
of the utility with the message it was required to carry. rd. at 21 (Burger, L concurring)
(identifying "the central question presented by this case" as "the infringement of Pacific's
right to be free from forced association with views with which it disagrees").
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from Pacific Gas, based in part on his different
opinion as to the factual matter of whether consumers were likely to identify the utility
with the opinions expressed in the insert. "The plurality argues ... that the right of access
also implicates [the utility's] right not to speak or to associate with the speech of others ....
The plausibility of any such prediction depends on the perceived ineffectiveness of a
disclaimer or the absence of any effective alternative means for consumer groups ... to
communicate to the ratepayers." rd. at 31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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unanimous Court held that Massachusetts violated the First Amendment
rights of private parade organizers by requiring them to allow a group
promoting homosexual rights to march in their St. Patrick's Day
l35
parade.
The Court again posed the question in terms of whether the
speaker was likely to be identified with the message it was required to
carry.l36 It concluded that in "the context of an expressive parade ...
each unit's expression is perceived by spectators as part of a whole, 137
and that spectators were therefore likely to identify the group's message
l38
with the parade as a whole.
We can now return to the compelled subsidization of the speech of
others. Taking Buckley's particularized analysis as a model, the question
is whether, or to what extent, the expressive interests at stake in
compelled speech - the likely identification of the speaker with the
message she is forced to carry - are also in play in the compelled
subsidization of the speech of others.
To begin with, let us distinguish the situation where an individual
dissenter objects because the speech she is paying for expressly identifies
her with its message. Thus a milk producer might object to a generic
milk advertisement with the tagline, "Brought to you by America's dairy
farmers," or an auto worker to a union ad that concludes, "A message
from America's auto workers." If this is the complaint, then it has
nothing to do with compelled subsidization. The expressive harm - the
forced association with an objectionable message - lies in the false
attribution and exists whether or not the dissenter is required to pay for
that message. In fact, this is simply another species of compelled speech
- different in that the dissenter is not required to carry the message
herself, but identical with respect to the nature of the harm. The
problem is nicely captured by an appropriate metaphor: the government
is putting words in people's mouths.
Putting aside such generic identification with a message, the question
is whether compelled payments themselves cause an expressive harm.
They do not, because there is no semantic nexus between the act of
paying and the message expressed. Buckley was right to recognize that
voluntary payments for the speech of others are often interpreted as
II

135 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
559 (1995).

[d. at 575.
ld. at 577.
"3 ld. at 575 ("GLIB's participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from
the Council's customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its
message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as well.").
136

"7
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symbolic acts of support, that they have an (albeit limited) expressive
content. But - and this is a version of the second idea implicit in
Rehnquist's Wooley dissent - our linguistic community does not
interpret the payment of mandatory assessments in the same way. And,
because the act of paying is not intrinsically symbolic, there is no chance
that compelled subsidization will be mistaken for something it is not, as
a newsletter in a billing envelope or a banner in a parade might be. The
one simply does not signify the other. The Wileman majority made
precisely this point when it rejected the idea of a connection between
compelled subsidization and compelled speech.
The use of assessments to pay for advertising does not require
respondents to repeat an objectionable message out of their own
mouths, require them to use their own property to convey an
antagonistic ideological message, force them to respond to a hostile
message when they "would prefer to remain silent," or require them
to be publicly identified or associated with another's message.
Respondents are not required themselves to sgeak, but are merely
required to make contributions for advertising. 9
There is no danger that dissenting payers will be understood to be
espousing the message their payments help fund. Consequently,
according to the compelled speech doctrine itself, dissenters have no
l40
First Amendment complaint. Though their payments fund expression,
the requirement to pay does not cause them an expressive harm.141

139
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 521 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1997) (emphasis added,
citations omitted); see also Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239-40 (2000) (Souter,
J., dissenting) ("In each [of the Court's compelled speech] cases, the government was
imposing far more directly and offenSively on an objecting individual than collecting the
fee that indirectly funds the jumble of other speakers' messages in this case." (citing Hurley,
515 U.s. at 572-74, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977), and W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.s. 624,626-29 (1943»; Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.s. 507, 541
(1991) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Petitioners' expressive
capacities have not been conscripted. Rather, petitioners have simply been required to pay
a pro rata share of lobbying costs incurred by a union representative, chosen pursuant to
majority vote."); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 806 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("No one's desire or power to speak his mind is checked or curbed."); Lathrop
v. Donahue, 367 U.s. 820, 860 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("1 do not think a ... decision
by the representatives of the majority of the bar members to devote some part of the
organization's funds to the furtherance of a legislative proposal so identifies the individual
payor of dues with the belief expressed that we are in the Barnette realm of 'asserted power
to force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief or to engage in any
ceremony of assent to one."').
140 Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87, 99 (1980).
141
Given that this conclusion rests on an analysis of compelled speech that Justice
Rehnquist introduced in Wooley and has never disclaimed (though see supra note 126), it is
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This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's broader
formulation of the difference between speech and conduct. In Texas v.
Johnson, the Court held that "[i]n deciding whether particular conduct
possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First
Amendment into play, we have asked whether '[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.",l42
Rehnquist suggested in his Wooley dissent that compelled speech is
unusual because it does not meet the first prong of this test - the
speaker does not necessarily want to convey the message and thus the
143
message is not intended in the relevant sense. Subsequent cases have
recognized, however, that some compelled speech still meets the second
prong - it can be interpreted as conveying a message - and therefore
still triggers First Amendment scrutiny.l44 Compelled subsidization of the
speech of others can satisfy neither prong. It is neither intended as a
communicative act nor understood as one. As such, it does not qualify
as speech under the Texas v. Johnson test. The First Amendment protects
the rights of individual dissenters - be it to freedom of belief or to
freedom of speech - only to the extent that dissenters intend to say
something or will be viewed as doing so. Where neither is the case, there
is no First Amendment harm.

difficult to understand why Rehnquist has consistently signed on to opinions identifying
the right against compelled subsidization with the right against compelled speech
(including Souter's dissent from Wileman). Rehnquist himself, in his dissent from Wooley,
anticipated the issues discussed here and perfectly described the lack of an expressive
interest at stake in compelled subsidization:
For example, were New Hampshire to erect a multitude of billboards, each
proclaiming "Live Free or Die," and tax all citizens for the cost of erection and
maintenance, clearly the message would be "fostered" by the individual citizentaxpayer and just as clearly those individuals would be "instruments" in that
communication. Certainly, however, that case would not fall within the ambit of
Barnette. In that case, as in this, there is no affirmation of belief. For First
Amendment principles to be implicated, the State must place the citizen in the
position of either apparently, or actually "asserting as true" the message.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.s. 705,721 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
142
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405,410-11 (1974)).
143
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 720-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144
Hurley, 515 U.s. at 575, 577; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1,
15, 18,20-21.
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A First Amendment Harm to Individual Dissenters?

We have yet to be provided with an adequate description of a First
Amendment harm to individuals who are forced to subsidize the speech
of others. Recourse to freedom of belief fails, first, because the mere act
of paying for the actions of others is too morally thin to support the
claim that it significantly interferes with dissenters' ability to act on their
beliefs and, second, because there is no principled explanation of why
the compelled subsidization of speech interferes with dissenters' beliefs
more than payments for other activities. The appeal to freedom of
expression fails because no one is likely to identify dissenters with the
views their payments help fund. As a matter of logic, this does not
prove that compelled subsidization causes individual dissenters no First
Amendment harm. It does, however, show that we have yet to receive a
convincing account of such a harm. The burden is on those who say it
l45
exists to come forward with an explanation of where it lies.
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT NOT TO
SUBSIDIZE

Without a coherent account of precisely how compelled subsidization
threatens First Amendment interests, the outcomes of cases have
depended on the competing intuitions of the justices deciding them,
14' Lawrence Tribe has argued that both the compelled speech and the compelled
subsidization cases should be understood as resting on
a right not to be used or commandeered to do the state's ideological bidding by
having to mouth, convey, embody or sponsor a message, especially the state's
message, with one's voice or body or resources, on one's personal possessions,
through the composition of the associations one joins or forms, or in their
selection of teachers, exemplars, and leaders.
Tribe, supra note 94, at 645. But when he attempts to explain the basis of this First
Amendment anti-commandeering principle, Tribe returns to the idea that it is the message
itself, not the fact that it is funded through compelled subsidization, that is the problem:
In contrast, any legitimate goals the state seeks to achieve by using individuals or
associations to conveyor endorse its views are likely to be achievable by the state
speaking with its own voice, at the expense of all taxpayers rather than just those
few who are singled out to bear the burden as serving as the state's megaphone.

Id. (emphasis added). The suggestion seems to be that the fact that all taxpayers are not
asked to pay for the message is evidence that the message itself is problematic - perhaps
because it is too unpopular or controversial. (Tribe doesn't explain what he means by
"legitimate.") But this evidentiary observation should not be mistaken for a constitutional
principle. Tribe's argument suggests that the real problem is not that the cost is born by the
few, but that the message expressed is not a permissible one. If this is the case, why not
simply focus on the constitutional legitimacy of the message?
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rather than on a general rule. Thus we find one test for unions and state
bars (the three-part Lehnert test), another for commercial advertising
(most recently germaneness to a non-expressive program), and still a
third for student fees (legitimate purpose and viewpoint neutrality).
These various standards are to some extent at odds with one another,
and none of them provides a clear path forward for deciding future cases
in other contexts.
But the situation is not unsalvageable. To say that the outcomes of the
Supreme Court's compelled subsidization cases have been driven more
by individual justices' legal and political intuitions about the facts before
them than by a principled account of the First Amendment interests at
stake is not to say that those cases were decided wrongly. It is the genius
of the common law that judges can get it right before they know why. In
this part, I attempt to abduce a different and more principled account of
the First Amendment right against compelled subsidization. My thesis is
that most, though not all, of the outcomes would be kept intact and
provided a secure foundation were the Supreme Court to hold that the
distinctive First Amendment interest at stake is not that of individual
dissenters, but the potential harm to public political discourse.
A.

Old Holdings in New Theory

It is hardly revolutionary to claim that the First Amendment's free

speech clause is meant to protect not only individual speakers, but also
the "marketplace of ideas." The thesis has a long pedigree and continues
to play a role in discussions of the First Amendment, including the
debates over the regulation of hate speech, pornography, broadcasting,
l46
and, as will be discussed in Part IV, campaign finance regulation.
I
will label such approaches "forum theories," because they consider one
of the essential purposes of the Free Speech Clause to be the protection of
expressive forums. Forum theories stand opposed to what I will call
"liberty theories," which treat the protection of the individual's freedom
of expression as the essential purpose of the First Amendment.
Forum theories are most often emphasized where individual liberties
are perceived to threaten the free exchange of ideas or democratic
processes. Campaign finance regulation is a paradigm case: the freedom

,.. See, e.g., JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE
SPEECH (1996); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLmCAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUI10NAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 1405 (1986). For criticism of the idea, see Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993).
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of wealthy individuals to wade into electoral discourse, it is claimed,
distorts the electoral process. To protect the forum, we must restrict the
147
liberty of individual contributors.
This fact - that one most often sees an appeal to a forum principle
where it is in opposition to the liberty principle - can give rise to the
illusion that the principles stand in a necessary tension with one another.
They do not, and not only because, as the forum theorist will tell you,
individual freedom of expression is essential to a properly functioning
marketplace of ideas. The principles are not coextensive in their
consequences and there can be no tension where those consequences do
not overlap.l48
Part II showed that the doctrine of compelled
subsidization cannot be explained by the liberty theory's emphasis on
harm to individual dissenters. The suggestion now is that a forum
theory can fill that gap.
One finds scattered references to this idea in the Supreme Court's
compelled subsidization opinions. As early as 1961, Justice Black argued
that the political expenditure of mandatory union dues "injects federal
compulsion into the political and ideological processes, a result which I
have supposed everyone would agree the First Amendment was
particularly intended to prevent.,,149 In his dissent from the Court's most
recent compelled subsidization decision, Justice Breyer addresses the
thought (though Kennedy's majority opinion did not mention it) with
the observation that the compelled subsidization of commercial speech
does not threaten any "special democratic need to protect the channels of
public debate, i.e., the communicative process. "ISO Nor has the idea been
lost on commentators. In a 1983 critical analysis of Abood, Norman
Cantor argued that "[tJhe critical constitutional interest at stake [in

Not that this is the only reason to regulate campaign financing.
For a similar idea, see Stem, supra note 114.
149 Int'I Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 789 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 788 ("Probably no one would suggest that Congress could, without violating [the
First] Amendment, pass a law taxing workers, or any persons for that matter (even
lawyers), to create a fund to be used in helping certain political parties or groups favored
by the Government to elect their candidates or promote their controversial causes.").
Justice Harlan responded to this point in his concurrence to Lathrop, a case decided
the same day, with the argument that there was a "clear distinction in the wording of the
First Amendment between the protections of speech and religion, only the latter providing
a protection against 'establishment,'" and that even if political establishment were a
problem, government support of unions or bar associations "does not provide a fixed,
predictable conduit for government encouragement of particular views." Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.s. 820, 852-53 (Harlan, J., concurring).
ISO United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.s. 405, 426 (2001) (citing Robert Post, The
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA 1. REv. 1, 14-15 (2000».
147
148
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compelled subsidization] is governmental establishment of particular
political causes."ISI But these have remained voices in the wilderness, as
most justices and many commentators still hold fast to the idea that the
ls2
harm is to individual dissenters. It is thus worth working through the
details of the alternative approach.
Most, if not all, of the law of compelled subsidization follows from the
least controversial sort of forum principle, which I will call the "political
forum theory." From Meiklejohn on, proponents have focused the role
of the First Amendment in the protection and fostering of political
forums, as distinguished from scientific, artistic, commercial, or other
speech platforms. The institutions in which political discourse takes
place, it is argued, deserve special protection because "[a] free
marketplace of ideas is essential to the proper functioning of a
democratic system."IS3 The First Amendment, on this reading, "protects
the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which
154
we govern."
From the general principle that a central function of the First
Amendment is the protection of political forums we can extract any
number of corollaries, some more controversial than others. The
relevant one for our purposes is what Robert Kamenshine has called the
First Amendment's "implied political establishment clause."ISS This is
the principle that the state has no business participating in public debate
on contentious political issues (which is not to say that the state may not
legitimately speak in other forums or on other topics).I56 The idea is
exemplified by the recent outcry over the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") production of videos that were distributed to
Cantor, supra note 23, at 7; see also Jacobs, supra note 23, at 171-76.
152 See
especially Wasserman, supra note 23, at 191 ("The prohibition on
government-compelled expression or support of private expression protects these interests
in personhood and individual liberty by prohibiting government interference with
individual thought, conscience, or belief through a requirement that one adopt, present, or
support any message or idea that she does not wish to adopt, present, or support."
(emphasis added»; see also Greene, supra note 23, at 466-67.
153 Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause,
67 CAL. L. REv. 1104, 1105 (1979). Kamenshine expressly limits his "political establishment"
principle (see infra) to political speech. Id. at 1113 ("The principal interest that the first
amendment protects is freedom of political expression necessary to the proper functioning
of a democratic system. In view of this, courts should deny a first amendment challenge to
nonpolitical speech by the government."); cf Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J.
lSI, 186-87 (1996).
154 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 255.
155 Kamenshine, supra note 153 passim.
156 Participation in a marketplace is different from the regulation of a marketplace. On
the version advocated here, the political establishment principle applies only to the former.
151
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local television news departments for rebroadcast without identifying
HHS as their source and which portrayed a new Medicare drug law as a
boon to the elderly.157 While the agency had an obligation to inform the
public of the new rules, its job was not to promote the changes or the
elected officials responsible for them. The intuitive idea that such
"political establishment" is contrary to First Amendment principles can
be filled out with two separate arguments.
First, public political discourse functions correctly when the mix of
voices reflects the varying potencies of different viewpoints within the
populace as a whole. The space that a given viewpoint occupies in the
political marketplace of ideas should be a function of its adherents'
numbers and the strength of their convictions. Government restrictions
on speech cause distortions because they act like restrictive zoning
ordinances, preventing certain views or interests from garnering the real
estate they deserve. But as any developer will tell you, the shape of a
city is driven just as much by government subsidies - tax breaks, bond
issues, etc. The government also distorts public political discourse when
it subsidizes (or forces others to subsidize) one viewpoint or interest at
the expense of others. Because the First Amendment provides special
protections to political forums, it prohibits such state interference with
them.
The second argument involves a version of the "who will watch the
watchmen" problem and applies particularly to debate on the policy and
political issues on which elections turn - the issues that make up the
platforms of candidates and political parties. Elected officials are
interested parties in public discussion of these matters. Consequently,
there is a danger that when these officials (or those beholden to them)
put the government's muscle behind one side or another, it is not simply
to express their views, but to use their power to perpetuate their
positions in government. Because it does not employ the normative
ideal of a proper mix of voices, this argument is less ambitious than the
first.
Instead, it emphasizes a special danger of government
participation in political discourse. The ~roblem here is not distortion,
but conflict of interest and manipulation. 8 As Kamenshine puts it, "[I]f

157 See Robert Pear, Ruling Says White House's Medicare Videos Were Illegal, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2004, at A24; Robert Pear, U.S. Videos, for TV News, Come Under Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at Al.
158 The attentive reader will have noticed that this second argument involves a sort of
anti-indoctrination principle. But unlike the risk of indoctrination through compelled
speech (recall the discussion of Barnette above), the target indoctrinee is the public at large,
not the individual subjects of a state compulsion.
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a government can manipulate [the] marketplace, it can ultimately
subvert the processes by which the people hold it accountable.,,159
The most obvious tool for political establishment is government
speech - where the state uses tax dollars to speak or to pay for the
l60
speech of others.
But the compelled subsidization of private speech
161
When the
can likewise be a mechanism for political establishment.
government requires some individuals to pay for the political or
ideological speech of others, and when the recipients of the funds have
an identifiable and controversial political agenda, then the government is
essentially putting its muscle behind one interest or point of view at the
expense of others and is engaging in a form of political establishment.
This suggests the following standard for compelled subsidization cases:
The compelled subsidization of the speech of others violates the First
Amendment only when the funds collected are used to promote the message of
an identifiable viewpoint or interest in debate on a controversial political
issue. 162 This relatively simple formulation gives rise to a number of
159
Kamenshine, supra note 153, at 1105 (footnote omitted); accord MARK G. YUOOF,
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLmcS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 15

(1983) (arguing that we must guard against government participation in political discourse
that might be used "to falsify consent" by creating "a majority will through uncontrolled
indoctrination activities").
160 These implications have been explored extensively in YUOOF, supra note 159.
161
In fact, Kamenshine reads Abood as a political establishment case. Kamenshine,
supra note 153, at 1107-09. While Kamenshine is right that Abood's outcome can be justified
on political establishment principles, the Court's reasoning was based on very different
principles. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.s. 209, 234-36 (1977).
The idea of a political establishment principle is one way to unpack Tribe's reference
to "legitimate goals" the state may seek to achieve when it speaks, which may be
threatened by compelled subsidization. See supra note 145.
162
Cantor also argues that the crucial harm that the compelled subsidization doctrine
protects against is government meddling in the political marketplace. But he focuses on
the compelled subsidization of speech by unions and other service organizations, and ends
up with a test that is more specific and makes more factual assumptions than the above
proposal.
Cantor concludes that there are sufficient safeguards against political
establishment if "the institution benefiting from forced payments in fact performs a useful
service, ... the payors are among the class benefiting, or potentially benefiting from such
services [and] any 'political' outlays by the institution are related to the basic object of the
institution ... and these political outlays are not being exploited strictly for partisan ends."
Cantor, supra note 23, at 38.
Jacobs argues that the constitutional touchstone for both compelled subsidization
and compelled speech, which she would group together under the title "compelled
expression," should be whether "the government's purpose is to manipulate the speech
market to adjust the relative weights of the voices in it." Jacobs, supra note 23, at 171; see
also Jacobs, supra note 9, at 459-69. With respect to compelled subsidization, this is broadly
consistent with the. above proposal. But there are significant differences in the details. For
one thing, Jacobs attempts to resuscitate the Lathrop factors as the appropriate test under
this rationale. Jacobs, supra note 23, at 173-75. Jacobs's rule would also seem to hold that
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complexities in its application, which are the topic of the next part.
Before turning to them, however, I want to argue that the standard
provides a coherent account of the outcomes of the Court's compelled
subsidization decisions to date.
This proposed test has two separate prongs. The first asks whether the
compelled payments fund political speech. If not, then there is no
violation of the political establishment principle. If they do fund political
speech, the court must ask, second, whether they are used to fund an
identifiable viewpoint or interest. Only if compelled payments do not
fund political speech or an identifiable viewpoint or interest does the
program pass First Amendment scrutiny.
The first prong provides a straightforward per se rule: so long as
funded speech is neither political nor ideological, there is no First
Amendment violation. This result is not surprising, given that, for the
moment, we are considering the implications of a political forum theory.
But it is also consistent with most of the Supreme Court's holdings in its
compelled subsidization cases. The Court has occasionally held that
nonpolitical expenditures do give rise to First Amendment violation.
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, which applied a limiting
interpretation of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") that maps onto the First
Amendment right against compelled subsidization,163 held that a union's
the government's entrance into any sort of expressive forum, political or not, is
impermissible. Thus she treats government manipulation of commercial speech as just as
suspect as manipulation of political speech. Id. at 176-80. Finally, Jacobs lumps compelled
speech together with compelled subsidization and assumes that both should be governed
by a single rule. She takes, for instance, the fact that there is no "message alteration" in
compelled subsidization to be an argument that this cannot be among the First
Amendment harms of compelled speech. Id. at 166. As the analysis in Part II has
demonstrated, compelled speech does harm individuals' First Amendment interests in a
way that compelled subsidization does not. There is no reason to look for a single rule to
govern both sorts of cases.
Wasserman also suggests that public forums, which embody a sort of viewpointneutrality principle, be immune from the right against compelled subsidization.
Wasserman, supra note 23, at 231-36. But his argument for this approach relies on an
account of the right against compelled subsidization that emphasizes the harm to
individual dissenters and a notion that the forum mitigates this harm. "No speech is, in
fact, funded with any fees charged and collected by the government in maintaining a
public forum. Only the forum is funded; that is, only the physical place and the services
associated with that place or only the pool of money." Id. at 231; see also id. at 168 ("A
forum, in and of itself, is not expressive. Whatever private speech ultimately occurs in and
through that forum is irrelevant to the payer's claim."). This quasi-metaphysical argument
is unsatisfactory. As far as the individual dissenter is concerned (and Wasserman bases his
argument on the potential harm to the individual), it makes no difference that her money is
filtered through an intermediary organization or institution. The dignitary harm comes
from that fact that she is foreseeably forced to fund speech with which she disagrees.
163
Ellis v. Bd. of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.s. 435,445-48 (1984). In examining the union dues at
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general orgaruzmg efforts were not sufficiently germane to collective
l64
bargaining to be allowable under the RLA
And, of course, United
Foods held that compelled payments for industry advertising violated the
First Amendment if the advertising was not embedded in a larger
l65
regulatory program. But these are the only two outliers. In both Ellis
and Lehnert, the Court held that most of the challenged nonpolitical
union expenditures did not violate the First Amendment (in Ellis,
conventions, social activities, and union publications; in Lehnert,
collective bargaining activities of the parent union, a nonpolitical union
publication, conventions, and preparations for a potentially illegal
strike).l66 And Wileman went so far as to suggest that only "political or
ideological disagreement with the content of the message" could
produce a "crisis of conscience" and therefore implicate the First
167
Arnendment.
While the proposed test suggests that the United Foods
majority erred, the Court's other constitutional holdings can be kept
largely intact.
As for the second prong, it is a factual question whether a given
organization or program can be expected to engage in speech that is
identifiable with a specific political viewpoint or interest. Justice Black
maintained in his 1961 Street dissent that a union's use of members'
funds for political and legislative activities "injects federal compulsion
issue in that case, Ellis first applied a limiting interpretation of the RLA set forth in Street,
367 U.S. 740 (1961), and then applied the Abood standard to the surviving expenditures. It
is commonly recognized that Street's interpretation of the RLA is at best strained and
informed less by the text of the statute than a concern to avoid the constitutional issue. See
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.s. 740, 784-86 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at
799-803 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Abood, 431 U.s. at 232; Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,
500 U.S. 507, 555 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Air Line Pilots
Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.s. 866, 873 (1998). It is also commonly recognized that the Street
interpretation of the RLA places that act precisely within the limits that later cases would
establish for the First Amendment right against compelled subsidization. See Lehnert, 500
U.S. at 516 ("Although [it is a case] of statutory construction, Street [is] instructive in
delineating the bounds of the First Amendment in this area as well."); id. at 555 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Street [was a statutory case], but there is good
reason to treat [it] as merely reflecting the constitutional rule suggested in Hanson and later
confirmed in Abood."). But see Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 76162 (1988) (applying Street interpretation of RLA to similar proviSion in National Labor
Relations Act, despite fact that latter did not involve state action so as to raise First
Amendment issue).
'64 466 U.S. at 451-53. Ellis also held that litigation not related to the bargaining unit in
question was not allowable. [d. at 453. The Court subsequently explained, however, that
part of the problem was the "political and expressive nature of litigation." Lehnert, 500 U.S.
at 528.
'65 United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 415 (2001).
'66 500 U.S. at 527-32.
167 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 472 (1997).
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into the political and ideological processes," an argument that assumes
that unions take identifiable and controversial positions on political
l68
issues.
Harlan replied in Lathrop that "the Integrated Bar does not
provide a fixed, predictable conduit for governmental encouragement of
particular views," a position he presumably also would have taken with
169
respect to unions.
The holdings of subsequent cases, read in light of
the proposed principle, suggest that a majority of the Court eventually
accepted Black's, and not Harlan's, assessment. Since recognizing the
First Amendment right against compelled subsidization, the Court has
consistently held that political expenditures by covered unions or
integrated bars are unconstitutional. 170 Whether this is empirically
171
But the outcomes of these cases are
correct is, of course, debatable.
compatible with the recommended test.
Finally, the proposed standard correctly predicts the outcome in
Southworth. While the university program at issue in Southworth
involved the compelled subsidization of political speech, the Court
found that the fact that funds were not earmarked for a single viewpoint
172
or interest rendered it constitutional.
Though the state university's
student activity program fostered political speech, the university was not
selectively funding such speech in a way that threatened the forum
principle. Southworth's emphasis on viewpoint neutrality provides a
map of where the Court should take the compelled subsidization
doctrine.
The Court can begin to head in the right direction by reversing the
Eleventh Circuit's holding in Veneman, overturning United Foods, and
reaffirming the approach it took just four years earlier in Wileman. As
Wileman recognized, compelled payments for industry-association
advertising do no First Amendment harm to individual payers. Nor
does governmental interference in this commercial forum violate the
principles that coherently explain the Court's other compelled
subsidization holdings. The beef advertising program at issue in
Veneman may rub dissenting producers the wrong way. And such
programs may well be problematic as a matter of public policy, for they

Street, 367 U.s. at 789 (Black, J., dissenting).
Lathrop, 367 U.s. at 853 (Harlan, J., concurring); Street, 367 U.s. at 797 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting, joined by Harlan, J.).
170
See supra text accompanying note 83.
m For an argument that it is incorrect, see Cantor, supra note 23, at 31-35 (arguing that
168

169

"[tlrade unions and many professional associations are primarily service institutions rather
than facades for a partisan political perspective").
In Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.s. 217, 233 (2000).
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often impose the costs of generic advertising disproportionately relative
to the benefits conferred on individual industry members. But they do
173
not violate the First Amendment.
B.

Applying and Extending the Approach

The above argument has something like the form of scientific
induction. Beginning with the outcomes of the Supreme Court's
compelled subsidization cases, I have proposed a standard that more
coherently accounts for those holdings than does the Court's own
reasoning.
A First Amendment political establishment principle
provides the best argument for most of the current limits on compelled
subsidization. It provides a generally applicable, fairly bright line rule
that applies to all compelled subsidization cases, as distinguished from
the germaneness and the substantial-burden criteria the Court has
applied in the past. That rule clarifies the relevance of the political or
ideological content of expenditures. And the rule rejects United Foods'
unexplained reliance on the existence vel non of non-expressive
regulations. Finally, the approach rests on a sustainable account of the
First Amendment interests at stake.
While the proposed standard is based on what is sometimes called a
"collectivist" theory of the First Amendment, it does not threaten
individual-liberty theories, which simply cannot account for the right
174
against compelled subsidization.
Compelled subsidization, unlike
compelled speech, does no harm to individual dissenters' First
Amendment interests. The political forum theory shows when and why
compelled subsidization nevertheless poses a First Amendment problem.
This is not to say that the approach does not give rise to hard
questions. One has already appeared: the factual question whether it is
173 Such a holding would lie within the scope of the question the Court granted
certiorari on:
"Whether the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 and the
implementing Beef Promotion and Research Order violate the First Amendment insofar as
they require cattle producers to pay assessments to fund generic advertising with which
they disagree." Veneman, Pet. for Writ of Cert., 2004 WL 304352, at *1; Veneman v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 124 S. Ct. 2389 (2004) [hereinafter Venemen, Pet. for Cert.]. The
Court may choose to focus instead, however, on the issue of whether the generic
advertising at issue in the case qualifies as government speech. See Livestock Marketing
Ass'n v. USDA, 335 F.3d 711, 719-20 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing whether program at issue in
Veneman qualifies as government speech); Veneman, Pet. for Cert., at 14-24. Of course, it
might also hold that United Foods effectively overruled Wileman, which would have the
advantage of clarifying the law with respect to generic industry advertising, though it
would hardly leave the doctrine as a whole better off.
174
See Post, supra note 146, at 1114-23; Morris Lipson, Note, Autonomy and Democracy,
104 YALE L.}. 2249, 2274 (1995).
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foreseeable that the recipient of compelled funds will use them to
advance an identifiable political viewpoint or interest. There are at least
three others: defining what counts as a "debate on a controversial
political issue," whether we should expand the doctrine to prohibit the
compelled subsidization of ideological speech, and the implications of
even more robust forum theories.
If we stick with political forum theories, there is the definitional
question: What counts as "debate on a controversial political issue"?
Reading the proposed standard back into the cases, the Court's decisions
provide some guidance. For instance, the union cases establish that prounion impact litigation is sufficiently political, while union conventions
are not. But certainly there are undecided cases out there (e.g., IOLTAfunded constitutional litigation) and more work to be done.
One source for thinking about a generic definition is the Federal
175
Communication Commission's ("FCC") now defunct fairness doctrine.
In order to determine when a broadcaster was required to present
alternative views of an issue discussed on the air, the FCC devised a twopart test: first, the issue must be controversial, as measured by "the
degree of attention paid to [itl by government officials, community
leaders, and the media"; second, it must be of public importance, for
which the test is "not the extent of media or government attention, but
rather a subjective evaluation of the impact that the issue is likely to have
on the community at large.,,176 Another source for line-drawing is the
Government Accounting Office's ("GAO") evolving interpretation of
Congressional prohibitions on spending appropriated funds for
177
unauthorized "publicity or propaganda."
The GAO has interpreted
such provisions to prohibit "the use of appropriated funds for materials
that are self-aggrandizing, purely partisan in nature, or covert as to
source," characteristics that can serve as additional indicators of
particularly problematic expenditures in the context of compelled
. 178
sub S1'd'1zation.

175 See Kamenshine, supra note 153, at 1113-15.
'" The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standard of the Communications Act- Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 12 (1974).
177 See, e.g., Labor Federal Security Appropriation Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 134, ch. 373,
§ 702, 65 Stat. 209, 223 (1951) ("No part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be
used for publicity or propaganda purposes not heretofore authorized by Congress.").
178 In re Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services - Video News Releases, File No. 8-302710 (Gen. Accounting Office May 19, 2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/302710.pdf; see also Letter from
Anthony H. Gamboa, General Counsel, General Accounting Office, to Hon. Frank R.
Lautenbert et aI., 6-8, Mar. 10, 2004) (GAO. File No. 8-302504), available at
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While the FCC and GAO decisions provide useful models, the
definitional question is not simply a semantic one. Where one draws the
line around the political should depend at least in part on why one
thinks political establishment is problematic. Thus the who-will-watchthe-watchmen argument - according to which the problem with state
participation in political discourse is that it can be used to "falsify
consent"l79 - suggests a relatively narrow definition. If the danger is
incumbent protectionism, the relevant topics are just those likely to be at
issue in the next election - the issues on which the candidates and
parties differ. The distortion argument, on the other hand, which finds
problematic the effect that state favoritism can have on the mix of voices,
is compatible with a broader definition. On the broader reading, any
number of controversial issues might count as "political," even though
public opinion on them is not likely to affect election outcomes.
As the definition of the political gets broader, escaping the policy
questions that drive elections, it shades into what might instead be called
"ideological" speech, which I take to include both speech on
uncontroversial policy matters (e.g., the validity of the Constitution) and
on nonpolicy but highly charged value questions (e.g., abstinence vs.
contraception). As far back as 1961, Justice Black complained that the
political expenditure of mandatory union dues "injects federal
compulsion into the political and ideological processes,,,I80 and the Court
has since continued to invoke the two categories together. 181 One
explanation of the Court's regular inclusion of the ideological is its
occasional mistaken adherence to a freedom-of-belief account, for
ideological disagreement with the message funded is as likely to cause a
182
crisis of conscience as is political disagreement.
Having rejected that
argument, it is worth asking whether there is another one for a right
against funding ideological speech as well.
Both of the proposed arguments for a political establishment principle
focus on the function of political forums in democratic decisionmaking.
To the extent that an issue is neither a matter of current controversy nor

http://www.gao.gov / decisions/ appro/302710.pdf. (discussing history of GAO's
interpretation of publicity and propaganda prohibitions).
17'J
YUDOF, supra note 159, at 15.
180
Int'I Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 789 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
181
See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.s. 457, 472 (1997); Keller v.
State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1,14 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,235-36
(1977).
182
See Wileman, 521 U.s. at 472.
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directly related to public policy, it does not implicate such a principle.
This is not to say that there are not good reasons for the government to
keep its hands out of ideological forums. But expanding the compelled
subsidization doctrine to include the compelled subsidization of
nonpolitical, yet ideological speech involves more difficult line-drawing
(what distinguishes legitimate topics of public health and welfare from
nonlegitimate ideological matters?) and re<iuires an argument beyond
the narrow political establishment principle. Extending the doctrine in
this direction might well be desirable, but would take some work.
Finally, it is worth considering the ways in which forum theories can
cut the other way. Owen Fiss has championed a more far-reaching First
Amendment forum principle, arguing that state promotion of socially
orthodox viewpoints, such as "family values," at the expense of minority
lss
views may well violate the First Amendment.
Fiss, therefore, can be
counted among those who would expand the anti-establishment
principle beyond the political to include at least ideological speech. But
Fiss also argues that the First Amendment not only limits government
expressive activities, but requires the government "to ensure the fullness
and richness of public debate" by actively promoting minority
l86
viewpoints. Fiss's egalitarian forum principle might well authorize the
compelled subsidization of political and ideological speech that
expresses minority viewpoints.
This is not the place to examine all of the arguments for and against
Fiss's theory.187 The point is only that once one shifts the focus away
from the insult to individual dissenters to the impact of compelled
subsidization on the general mix of expression, a host of new
considerations emerge. While case outcomes have so far remained on
the relatively uncontroversial ground of the "no political establishment"

183
Kamenshine, though he employs a who-will-watch-the-watchmen argument for his
political establishment principle, nonetheless advocates a definition that encompasses what
I would call "ideological" speech. Thus he would keep the public importance prong of the
old fairness doctrine test and drop the controversy requirement. He concludes that while,
for example, "[t)he capitalism-socialism debate ... is hardly controversial ... , basic first
amendment values should require that courts prohibit government expressions of the
intrinsic superiority of a capitalist society." Kamenshine, supra note 153, at 1114. But it is
doubtful whether this broad definition of the "political" is supported by Kamenshine's
narrow argument for the political establishment principle.
184
For a discussion of the line-drawing difficulties, see Lee C. Bollinger, The Sedition of
Free Speech, 81 MICH. 1. REv. 867 (1983) (reviewing YUOOF, supra note 159).
185 FISS, IRONY, supra note 146, at 37.
186
[d. at 4l.
187
For some cogent comments on the limits of Fiss's approach that are relevant in the
context of compelled subsidization, see Post, supra note 153, at 187-92.
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principle, there may well be room for other claims.
CONCLUSION: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION AGAIN

This Article' began by noting the way that recent campaign finance
cases have raised not only the connection between money and speech,
but also a version of the forum theory - the idea of a First Amendment
interest in protecting the electoral process from the distorting effects of
wealth. I want now to return to that topic and briefly survey what, if
anything, the reformed account of the right against compelled
subsidization has to say about campaign finance regulation.
We can begin with the relationship between money and speech. I have
argued that when money is spent for speech, it does not, for First
Amendment purposes, magically become equivalent to speech. This is
not to say, however, that campaign contributions and other political
donations do not have an expressive component. Buckley rightly saw
that the act of contributing to a candidate or cause is often both intended
and understood as a gesture of support. But the expressive content is
limited, and it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that money
equals speech. The First Amendment requires empirical sensitivity to
the nature of the expression, exactly where it is located, and when it is
threatened. Buckley recognized that a cap on how much one may
voluntarily contribute for the speech of another does limited harm to the
undifferentiated expressive content of such contributions. ISS
The
argument in Part II has shown that compelled payments do not even
have that expressive content and even the limited protections of Buckley
g9
.
are no Ionger appropnate.
What about the First Amendment interest in protecting political
processes? While the political forum principle operates both in the
compelled subsidization doctrine and in the area of campaign finance
regulation, it does so in different ways. First, in the case of compelled
188
By "expressive content" I mean the semantic content of the act of contributing itself.
As Buckley additionally observed, campaign contributions also have an effect on the ability
of the candidates who receive them to express themselves. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,2122 (1976). Buckley's discussion on this aspect of contributions rests on another corollary of
the political forum theory: that candidates who must communicate with a large, dispersed
electorate require a megaphone. Id. at 19 {"The electorate's increasing dependence on
television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these
expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political
speech.").
189 This conclusion differs from Jacobs's claim that "the means of fee compulsion as
opposed to expenditure restriction do not crucially distinguish the student activity fee and
campaign finance issues." Jacobs, supra note 9, at 458.
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subsidization, the individual liberty theory does no work and the forum
theory steps in to fill the gap. When it comes to campaign finance
regulation, on the contrary, attempts to protect political discourse often
conflict with the freedom of campaign contributors and independent
advocates to spend their money, and even voice their opinions, as they
wish.190 In this respect, campaign finance regulation requires a more
robust forum principle, one that supports limitations on individual
liberties that would otherwise trigger protections of the First
Amendment.
Second, compelled subsidization is an area where the forum principle
limits legislative action - the government may not force people to pay
for the expression of an identifiable controversial political viewpoint or
interest. In the case of campaign finance regulation, the forum principle
does not limit what the state may do, but permits the legislature to enact
laws that might otherwise contravene the First Amendment. Perhaps the
strongest objection to the above account of the right against compelled
subsidization is that courts are not equipped to police violations of the
political establishment principle. In the case of campaign finance
regulation, on the other hand, it is not the courts but the legislature that
invokes the principle. There is therefore a place for judicial deference to
legislative expertise in the campaign finance context.
There is no simple bridge from the way that the compelled
subsidization doctrine acts to protect political discourse to a First
Amendment forum principle that will support campaign finance
regulation. But the compelled subsidization doctrine indicates one locale
where the forum principle may already be at work in First Amendment
jurisprudence. More judicial attention to how it operates in that area
may at the very least make its application in the other less unnerving.
Hopefully the Supreme Court will use Veneman to put courts on the road
there.

190

Not all campaign finance regulation exhibits this to the same degree. See, e.g., BRUCE

ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WTIH DoLLARS (2002).

HeinOnline -- 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1139 2004-2005

***

HeinOnline -- 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1140 2004-2005

